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Abstract
This investigation into the traceability baseline in the United States finds that private-
sector food firms have developed a substantial capacity to trace. Traceability systems are
a tool to help firms manage the flow of inputs and products to improve efficiency, prod-
uct differentiation, food safety, and product quality. Firms balance the private costs and
benefits of traceability to determine the efficient level of traceability. In cases of market
failure, where the private sector supply of traceability is not socially optimal, the private
sector has developed a number of mechanisms to correct the problem, including con-
tracting, third-party safety/quality audits, and industry-maintained standards. The best-
targeted government policies for strengthening firms’ incentives to invest in traceability
are aimed at ensuring that unsafe or falsely advertised foods are quickly removed from
the system, while allowing firms the flexibility to determine the manner. Possible policy
tools include timed recall standards, increased penalties for distribution of unsafe foods,
and increased foodborne-illness surveillance. 
Keywords: traceability, tracking, traceback, tracing, recall, supply-side management,
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U.S. food producers have developed an enormous capacity to track the flow of food
along the supply chain, though individual systems vary. Some traceability systems are
deep, tracking food from the retailer back to the farm, while others extend back only to
a key point in the production process. Some systems are very precise, tracking food
products to the minute of production or the exact area of a field where they were grown.
Others are less precise, tracking product to farms in a large geographical area, such as
the area served by a single grain elevator. Some traceability systems collect and track
information on a broad range of attributes, while others track only a few. For example,
some coffee producers may market and track attributes such as fair trade, fair wage, and
shade grown, while others track none of these attributes. 
This report describes the results of an investigation into the amount, type, and adequacy
of traceability systems in the United States, focusing particularly on the fresh produce
sector, the grains and oilseeds sector, and the cattle/beef sector. The results stem from
research into the market studies literature, interviews with industry experts, and on-site
interviews with owners, plant supervisors, and/or quality control managers in fruit and
vegetable packing and processing plants; beef slaughter plants; grain elevators, mills,
and food manufacturing plants; and food distribution centers. In some cases, site visits
were conducted while in the company of auditors for USDA procurement programs. In
these cases, the firms’ complete traceability records were accessed. 
U.S. traceability systems tend to be motivated by economic incentives, not government
traceability regulation. Firms build traceability systems to improve supply-side manage-
ment, to increase safety and quality control, and to market foods with credence attributes
(attributes that are difficult for consumers to detect, such as whether a food was pro-
duced through genetic engineering). The benefits associated with these objectives
include lower-cost distribution systems, reduced recall expenses, and expanded sales of
high-value products. In every case, the benefits of traceability translate into larger net
revenues for the firm. These benefits are driving the widespread development of trace-
ability systems across the U.S. food supply chain. 
Traceability is not, however, the only means to these objectives – and it alone cannot
accomplish any of them. Simply knowing where a product is in the supply chain does
not improve supply management unless the traceability system is paired with a real-time
delivery system or some other inventory-control system. Tracking food by lot in the pro-
duction process does not improve safety unless the tracking system is linked to an effec-
tive safety control system. And of course, traceability systems do not create credence
attributes, they simply verify their existence. 
Firms use traceability systems together with a host of other management, marketing, and
safety/quality control tools. The dynamic interplay of the costs and benefits of these
tools has spurred different rates of investment in traceability across sectors – and contin-
ues to do so. Such variation is not an indication of inadequacy but of efficiency, the
result of a careful balancing of costs and benefits. Such variation is evident in the three
food sectors at the center of this investigation. 
In the fresh produce industry, the development of traceability systems has been greatly
influenced by the characteristics of the product. Perishability of and quality variation in
fresh fruits and vegetables necessitate the boxing and identification of quality attributes
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early in the supply chain, either in the field or packinghouse. This has facilitated the
establishment of traceability for a number of objectives including marketing, food safe-
ty, supply-side management, and differentiation of new quality attributes.
Virtually all grains and oilseeds produced in the United States are traceable from pro-
duction to consumption—for the most part, however, quality and safety variation in
grain and oilseeds has not warranted the cost of precise traceability systems. Systems
tracking product to elevators, at which point quality and safety are monitored, have been
largely sufficient for the efficient operation of grain and oilseed markets. Growing
demand for specialty crops, including non-genetically engineered products, has spurred
the development of more precise traceability systems, though the elevator still operates
as an important quality-control point. 
The cattle/beef sector has a long history of identifying and tracking animals to establish
rights of ownership and to control the spread of animal diseases. Producers in the meat
sector have also developed traceability systems to improve product flow and to limit
quality and safety failures. Recent developments are motivating firms to bridge separate
animal and meat traceability systems and to establish systems for tracking meat from the
farm to the retailer. Though technological innovations are helping to reduce the costs of
such systems, institutional and philosophical barriers have slowed their adoption. 
In some instances, the private costs and benefits of traceability may not be the same as
the social costs and benefits so that the private supply of traceability falls below socially
desirable levels. Instances of such market failure could lead to a sub-optimal supply of
traceability for product differentiation or for food safety. Both industry and government
have a number of options to help correct market failure. The best options are those tar-
geted at increasing firms’ incentives to build and maintain traceability systems.
Government-imposed systems tend to be ill suited to this task. 
In cases where markets supply too little traceability for product differentiation, individ-
ual firms and industry groups have developed systems for policing and advertising the
veracity of credence claims. Third-party safety/quality auditors are at the heart of these
efforts. These auditors provide consumers with verification that traceability systems
exist to substantiate credence claims. Government may also require that firms producing
foods with credence attributes substantiate their claims through mandatory traceability
systems. If firms are not required to prove that credence attributes exist, some may try to
gain price premiums by passing off standard products as products with credence attrib-
utes. One difficulty with mandatory traceability proposals is that they often fail to differ-
entiate between valuable quality attributes, those for which verification is needed, and
less valuable attributes for which no verification is needed. 
In cases where markets supply too little traceability for food safety traceback, a number
of industry groups have developed food safety and traceback standards. In addition, buy-
ers in every sector are increasingly relying on contracting, vertical integration, or associ-
ations to improve product traceability and facilitate the verification of safety and quality
attributes. Again, third-party auditors help verify that safety and traceback standards and
obligations have been met.
Government may also consider mandating traceability to increase food safety, but such a
mandate may impose inefficiencies on already efficient private traceability systems. The
already widespread voluntary use of traceability complicates the application of a central-AER-830  •  Traceability in the U.S. Food Supply USDA/Economic Research Service  •  v
ized system because firms have developed so many different approaches and systems of
tracking. If mandatory systems fail to allow for variations in traceability systems, they
will likely end up forcing firms to make adjustments to already efficient systems or to
create parallel systems.
Other policy options can encourage firms to strengthen their safety and traceability sys-
tems without requiring any specific process for doing so. For example, standards for
mock recalls (in which firms must prove that they can locate and remove all hypotheti-
cally contaminated food from the food supply within a certain amount of time) give
firms the freedom to develop efficient traceback systems while ensuring that such sys-
tems satisfy social objectives. 
Policy aimed at increasing the cost of distributing unsafe foods, such as fines or plant
closures, or policies that increase the probability of catching unsafe food producers,
such as increased safety testing or foodborne illness surveillance, will also provide firms
with incentives to strengthen their traceability systems. When the cost of distributing
unsafe food goes up, so too do the benefits of traceability systems. 
One area where industry has no incentive to create traceability systems is for tracking
food once it has been sold and consumed. No firm has an incentive to monitor the
health of the Nation’s consumers in order to speed the detection of unsafe product.
Government-supplied systems for monitoring the incidence of foodborne illness are
one option for helping close this gap in the food system’s traceability network. By bet-
ter providing this public good, the government could increase the capability of the
entire food supply chain to respond to food safety problems before they grow and
affect more consumers.Traceability systems are recordkeeping systems designed
to track the flow of product or product attributes through
the production process or supply chain. Recently, policy-
makers have begun weighing the usefulness of making
such systems mandatory so as to address issues ranging
from food safety and bioterrorism to consumers’ right to
know. For example, policymakers in many countries have
proposed or adopted mandatory systems to track animal
feed to control the risk of mad cow disease and to
improve meat safety. Other proposals involve mandatory
tracking of food transportation systems to reduce the risk
of tampering. Numerous proposals involve mandating
traceability to help provide consumers with information
on a variety of food attributes including country of ori-
gin, animal welfare, and genetic engineering. 
Food producers, manufacturers, and retailers have many
of the same concerns as government policymakers and in
fact already keep traceability records for a wide range of
foods and food attributes. The questions before policy-
makers are, does the private sector provide enough trace-
ability to meet social objectives? If not, what policy tools
are best targeted to increasing the supply of traceability? 
The objective of this study is to provide a framework to
answer those questions. To do that, we first needed an
accurate description of the extent and type of traceability
maintained by private firms, that is, the traceability base-
line. We could not begin to assess the adequacy of pri-
vate sector traceability systems without a clear under-
standing of how typical it is for firms to establish these
systems, why they establish them, and how they function.
We began our investigation by reviewing market studies,
interviewing government officials, and talking with
industry associations. Next, we conducted telephone
interviews with a wide range of food industry representa-
tives, including grain and food processors, fast-food
retailers, safety auditors, and food distributors. We con-
ducted several site visits in each of the three major food
sectors: fresh produce, grains, and livestock. During
these visits, we interviewed owners, plant supervisors,
and/or quality control managers in fruit and vegetable
packing and processing plants, beef slaughter plants,
grain elevators, mills and food manufacturing plants, and
food distribution centers. 
In each interview, we asked about the company’s trace-
ability system, including its bookkeeping records, lot or
batch sizing, computer use, and tracking technologies.
We asked about the cost of the traceability system and
about how long it had been in use. We received a high
level of voluntary cooperation from these firms, some-
times getting a tour of their facilities. However, our dis-
cussions were informal and we generally did not review
firms’ records to confirm the information provided. Our
discussions were often broad based about the firm’s
recordkeeping systems and we did not systematically
collect specific data about a firm’s traceability system.
A number of our site interviews were with firms that are
eligible to submit bids for U.S. procurement programs.
We received access to these firms by accompanying
USDA auditors on their inspections to ensure that the
firms were complying with procurement regulations and
guidelines. We asked the firms’ managers whether they
thought the firms’ traceability systems were typical for
their industries. While most indicated that their systems
were characteristic for their industry, some pointed out
their innovative and state-of-the-art approaches to trace-
ability. Our site-visit sample, thus, may be skewed to
firms that are at least average or better in their use of
good manufacturing practices, although we are confident
that our conclusions hold for the majority of firms in
each sector. 
Our investigations led us to conclude that 1) traceability
is an objective-specific concept; 2) the private sector in
the United States has developed a significant capacity to
trace; and 3) industry/product characteristics lead to sys-
tematic variation in traceability systems. We found that
efficient traceability systems vary across industries and
over time as firms balance costs and benefits to deter-
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I. Introduction and Methodologymine the efficient breadth, depth, and precision of their
traceability systems. We examine the evidence leading to
these conclusions in the second section of the report,
where we look at the factors that influence the costs and
benefits of traceability. The three chapters in Section III
provide further elaboration of these conclusions by
describing in detail the supply chain and traceability sys-
tems characterizing the fresh produce, grains and
oilseeds, and cattle/beef sectors. 
While private sector traceability systems are extensive,
gaps may nevertheless exist. Some gaps are the result of
an efficient balancing of traceability costs and benefits.
Others, however, are the result of market failures and
may warrant government intervention. To examine the
possibility that market failure has resulted in gaps in the
supply of traceability, we qualitatively analyzed and
compared social and private costs and benefits of trace-
ability. We found that asymmetric information problems
have the potential to dampen firms’ supply of traceabili-
ty for food safety and for product differentiation.
Section IV contains our analysis of market failure in the
provision of food traceability and our investigation into
the types of government policy tools that may correct
market failure and encourage the development of private
traceability systems. We also consider the characteristics
of a government-mandated traceability system that
would most efficiently mesh with private systems. The
appendix to this section lists selected mandatory trace-
ability laws in the United States. In section V, we pro-
vide some concluding thoughts. 
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“ability to trace the history, application or location of
that which is under consideration” (ISO, 2000).1 The
ISO guidelines further specify that traceability may refer
to the origin of the materials and parts, the processing
history, and the distribution and location of the product
after delivery.
This definition of traceability is quite broad. It does not
specify a standard measurement for “that which is under
consideration” (a grain of wheat or a truckload), a stan-
dard location size (field, farm, or county), a list of
processes that must be identified (pesticide applications
or animal welfare), where the information is recorded
(paper or electronic record, box, container or product
itself), or a bookkeeping technology (pen and paper or
computer). It does not specify that a hamburger be trace-
able to the cow or that the wheat in a loaf of bread be
traceable to the field. It does not specify which type of
system is necessary for identity preservation of tofu-qual-
ity soybeans, for quality control of cereal grains, or for
guaranteeing correct payments to farmers for different
grades of apples.
Complete Traceability is Impossible 
The definition of traceability is necessarily broad because
traceability is a tool for achieving a number of different
objectives. No single approach is adequate for every
objective. Even a hypothetical system for tracking beef,
in which consumers scan their packet of beef at the
check-out counter and receive information on the date
and location of the animal’s birth, lineage, vaccination
records, acreage of pasturage, and use of mammalian
protein supplements, is incomplete. It does not provide
traceability with respect to pest control in the barn (a
potential food safety issue), use of genetically engineered
feed, or animal welfare attributes like pasturage hours
and playtime. There are hundreds of inputs and processes
in the production of beef. A system for tracking each and
every input and process with a degree of precision ade-
quate for every objective would be virtually impossible. 
The characteristics of good traceability systems vary and
cannot be defined without reference to the system’s
objectives. Different objectives help drive differences in
the breadth, depth, and precision of traceability systems. 
Breadth describes the amount of information the trace-
ability system records. There is a lot to know about the
food we eat, and a recordkeeping system cataloging all
of a food’s attributes would be enormous, unnecessary,
and expensive. Take for example, a cup of coffee. The
beans could come from any number of countries; be
grown with numerous pesticides or just a few; grown on
huge corporate organic farms or small family-run con-
ventional farms; harvested by children or by machines;
stored in hygienic or pest-infested facilities; decaffeinat-
ed using a chemical solvent or hot water. A traceability
system for one attribute does not require collecting infor-
mation on other attributes. 
The depth of a traceability system is how far back or
forward the system tracks. In many cases, the depth of a
system is largely determined by its breadth: once the
firm or regulator has decided which attributes are worth
tracking, the depth of the system is essentially deter-
mined. For example, a traceability system for decaf-
feinated coffee would only need to extend back to the
processing stage (figure 1). A traceability system for fair
trade coffee would only need to extend to information
on price and terms of trade between coffee growers and
processors. A traceability system for fair wage would
only need to extend to harvest; for shade grown, to culti-
vation; and for non-genetically engineered (GE), to the
bean or seed. In other cases, the depth of the system is
determined by quality or safety control points along the
supply chain. In these cases, traceability systems may
only need to extend back to the last control point, that is
the point where quality or safety was established or veri-
fied. For example, a firm’s traceability system for
pathogen control may only need to extend to the last
“kill” step—where product was treated, cooked, or irra-
diated. 
Precision reflects the degree of assurance with which the
tracing system can pinpoint a particular food product’s
movement or characteristics. Precision is determined by
the unit of analysis used in the system and the acceptable
error rate. The unit of analysis, whether container, truck,
crate, day of production, shift, or any other unit, is the
tracking unit for the traceability system. Systems that
have large tracking units, such as an entire feedlot or
grain silo, will have poor precision in isolating safety or
quality problems. Systems with smaller units, such as
individual cows, will have greater precision. Likewise,
systems with low acceptable error rates, such as low tol-
erances for GE kernels in a shipment of conventional
corn, are more precise than systems with high acceptable
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II. Efficient Traceability Systems Vary
1 ISO is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies which
promotes the development of standardization and international stan-
dards for a wide range of products. ISO 9000 guidelines are quality
management system standards.error rates. In some cases, the objectives of the system
will dictate a precise system while for other objectives a
less precise system will suffice.
The breadth, depth, and precision of private traceability
systems will vary depending on the objectives of the sys-
tems and the corresponding benefits and costs to the
firm. Though at first glance this variability may appear to
indicate deficiencies in the private supply of traceability,
it is actually an indication of efficiency. Firms collect
information on an attribute and track its flow through the
supply chain only if the net benefits (benefits minus
costs) of doing so are positive. Likewise, they invest in
precision only if the benefits outweigh the costs. Because
firms balance the costs and benefits of traceability, they
tend to efficiently allocate resources to building and
maintaining these systems. 
Firms Consider a Wide Range of Costs 
and Benefits 
Traceability systems that yield positive net benefits to the
firm are a worthwhile investment; those yielding negative
net benefits are not worthwhile to the firm. Below, we
examine the range of benefits and costs that firms con-
sider when determining the efficient breadth, depth, and
precision for their traceability systems. 
Benefits of Traceability
Firms have three primary objectives in developing,
implementing, and maintaining traceability systems: to
improve supply management; to facilitate traceback for
food safety and quality; and to differentiate and market
foods with subtle or undetectable quality attributes. The
benefits associated with these objectives range from
lower-cost distribution systems, reduced recall expenses,
and expanded sales of products with attributes that are
difficult to discern. In every case, the benefits of trace-
ability translate into larger net revenues for the firm.
Firms establish traceability systems to achieve one or
more traceability objectives—and to reap the benefits.
These benefits are driving the widespread development
of traceability systems across the food supply chain. 
Objective/Benefits I: Traceability for Supply
Management  During 2000, American companies spent
$1.6 trillion on supply-related activities, including the
movement, storage, and control of products across the
supply chain (State of Logistics Report, 2001). The ability
to reduce these costs often marks the difference between
successful and failed firms. In the food industry, where
margins are thin, supply management is an increasingly
important area of competition. 
An indispensable element of any supply management
strategy is the collection of information on each product
from production to delivery or point of sale. The idea is
“to have an information trail that follows the product’s
physical trail” (Simchi-Levi, 2003, pg. 267). Information
trails, or in other words, traceability systems, provide the
basis for good supply management. A business’s trace-
ability system is key to finding the most efficient ways to
produce, assemble, warehouse, and distribute products.
The benefits of traceability systems for supply manage-
ment are greater the higher the value of coordination
along the supply chain. 
Electronic systems for tracking inventory, purchases, pro-
duction, and sales have become an integral part of doing
business in the United States. A few big retailers such as
Wal-Mart and Target have even created proprietary sup-
ply-chain information systems that they require their sup-
pliers to adopt. In addition to private systems, U.S. firms
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Figure 1
The depth of a traceability system depends on the attributes of interest
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Necessary depth of traceabilitymay also use industry-standard coding systems, such as
UPC codes (see box, “From UPC to RSS: Tracking
Technologies Drive Down the Costs of Precision”).
These systems are not confined to packaged products.
The food industry has developed a number of complex
coding systems to track the flow of raw agricultural
inputs to the products on grocery store shelves. These
systems are helping to create a supply management sys-
tem stretching from the farm to the retailer. 
Evidence that American companies are embracing new
sophisticated tracking systems can also be found in
macro-economic statistics. The success of traceability
systems in helping to control inventory costs is reflected
in national inventory-to-sales ratio statistics. Over short
time periods, inventories may rise or fall, but a consistent
pattern in which inventories fall relative to a firm’s total
sales indicates that the firm is getting better at keeping
track of its inputs and outputs and it is taking advantage
of that knowledge. Figure 2, showing the ratio of private
inventories to final sales of domestic business, displays a
declining time trend, falling by half since the end of
WWII (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003).
The same trend can be observed in many sectors of the
domestic food industry. Figure 3 shows the ratio of end-of-
year inventories to total value of shipments for proxies for
the dairy, grain, and sugar industries (Bartlesman, Becker,
and Gray, 2000). In every case, the inventory-to-sales ratio
fell, with the largest decline in the cereal sector, where the
ratio fell from over 8 percent to approximately 3 percent.
The downward trend in inventories in major components
of the food industry reflects growing efficiencies in supply
management, including traceability systems. 
Across the economy, firms are adopting systems to more
efficiently manage resources. In many cases, new track-
ing/information systems are at the heart of these efforts.
The depth, breadth, and precision of these systems vary
across industries and firms, mirroring the distribution
requirements of the enterprise.
Objective/Benefits 2: Traceability for Food Safety and
Quality Control  Product-tracing systems are essential
for food safety and quality control. Traceability systems
help firms isolate the source and extent of safety or qual-
ity-control problems. The more precise the tracing sys-
tem, the faster a producer can identify and resolve food
safety or quality problems. Firms have an incentive to
invest in traceability systems because they help minimize
the production and distribution of unsafe or poor quality
products, which in turn minimizes the potential for bad
publicity, liability, and recalls. 
Traceability systems can help track product distribution
and target recall activities, thereby limiting the extent of
damage and liability. Most, if not all, voluntary recalls
listed on USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service
website refer consumers to coded information on prod-
ucts’ packaging to identify the recalled items. The
advent of grocery store or club cards to track sales
enhances the potential for targeted recall information.
Grocery stores could use their sales data to identify and
then warn buyers of recalled products. Some have
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Ever since a 10-pack of Wrigley’s Juicyfruit gum was scanned
at the checkout counter in 1974, bar codes have become
ubiquitous in the U.S. grocery stores. Almost everything we
buy has packaging with printed bar codes. In the food indus-
try, the vast majority of packaged products bear bar codes, as
do a growing number of bulk foods, like bagged apples and
oranges.
The Uniform Code Council (UCC), a non-profit private com-
pany that establishes and promotes multi-industry standards
for product identification, created bar codes in response to the
needs of food manufacturers and retailers who were interest-
ed in speeding the checkout process at the grocery store and
for improving inventory management (Uniform Code Council,
2003). Bar codes contain a series of numbers reflecting type
of product and manufacturer (the UPC 12-digit code), and a
series of numbers assigned by the manufacturer to nonstan-
dard production or distribution details. Each product, includ-
ing those with different size packaging, contains a unique
UPC code. When a package is scanned under a laser beam
at the checkout counter, the store’s central computer reads
the UPC number, records the sale, and marks the change in
inventory. Recently, UCC has developed an extension of UPC
codes to 14 digits called the Global Trade Item Numbers
(GTIN) system, which contains expanded information about
companies, products, and product attributes worldwide
(Global Trade Item Numbers Implementation Guide, 2003).
The success of the original UPC system has combined with
technological advances and e-marketing to spur the develop-
ment of integrated systems that code, track, and manage
wholesale and retail transactions within the United States and
in the global community. In some cases, buyers manage
these systems to monitor supply flow. In other cases, firms
establish systems to link suppliers and buyers. For example,
EAN.UCC, which is a subsidiary of the UCC and EAN
International, a European commercial standard setting organ-
ization, has developed an open integrated system to stan-
dardize and automate information systems across a supply
chain that includes GTINs, along with an industry standard
set of 62 product attributes (EAN.UCC, 2003). With an inte-
grated system, the process of entering information into retail-
ers’systems is automated so when new information is logged
into the system by the producer, it’s added in real time to all
systems across a network. With such systems, anyone along
the chain can track inputs, production, and inventory by an
array of characteristics.
New technologies are spurring the development of even more
precise systems. One example of an upcoming technology is
the expansion of bar codes to reduced space symbology
(RSS) (Rowe, 2001).Currently, stickers with 4-digit price look-
up codes on fresh produce identify the product and assist the
retailer in inventory management. With RSS, 14-digit GTIN
bar codes could be attached to individual items. An apple, a
box, and a pallet could all be linked by the same product and
grower-shipper codes, with an additional numeric indicating
“item,” “box,” or pallet.” Similarly a package of ground beef
could be linked to a packinghouse.Other bar code application
identifiers and numbers could be used as well, including
price, weight, sell date, and lot. Having an electronic lot num-
ber on a package of ground beef would facilitate a traceback
in case of a quality or safety concern. Moreover, customers
who purchase specific foods using frequent shopper cards
can be quickly identified even if they have discarded the food
package. Thus, tracing forward or backward to facilitate sup-
ply chain management or quality and safety control would be
more easily and swiftly accomplished
Bar codes have a few disadvantages (Brain, 2003).In order to
keep up with inventories, companies must scan the bar code
under a laser beam.A more proactive technology would allow
a reader to scan a smart label—a computer chip embedded
in each product’s package, box, or pallet—whether the item
remains on the shelf (in the front part of the shelf or hidden in
the back) or is sold. For even more efficiency in retail store
management, the store could have a “smart setup.” In these
stores, a consumer could carry out their shopping and exit the
store without going to a checkout counter.Instead, a radio fre-
quency identification (RFID) reader embedded in an exit door
could read the smart tags simultaneously for each food pack-
age. Even detailed attributes could be read such as a 1-quart
container of non-fat organic milk with a sale date of January
14, 2004. Inventories on each product with all its unique
attributes even including “must sell by date” could be effi-
ciently traced and managed at manufacturing locations, ware-
houses, distribution centers and grocery stores.
Furthermore, computers at the grocery store and its suppli-
ers’ facilities would know automatically which items had been
purchased and needed to be replenished. The computers
would also be able to automatically notify the consumer’s
bank of charges and debit the consumer’s account.
While this scenario sounds like it may be far in the future,
RFID technology is not new and currently is used to track live-
stock and container cargo on trucks and ships. With RFID
tags, ranchers can determine the location and movements of
cattle and more quickly round up any particular heifer or steer.
With RFID tags, a distributor can determine precisely the
location of a cargo ship or truck and the condition of produce
in a controlled-atmosphere container. In July 2003, Wal-Mart
issued a mandate to its top suppliers requiring the use of
RFID tags on pallets and cases by the end of 2004 (Dunn,
2003). As the cost of RFID technology falls, it is possible that,
several years from now, we may see RFID tags on many indi-
vidual food items.
UCC and EAN International are facilitating the use of RFID
technology with the establishment of standardized Electronic
Product Codes (EPC) and an EPC network (EPCglobal,
2003). Unlike other electronic networks that are proprietary,
these will be open to any firm. Already Wal-Mart is requiring
its top suppliers to be EPC-compliant. With the use of elec-
tronics and widely accepted standards, the number of attrib-
utes that can be traced for each food product is nearly limit-
less.
From UPC to RSS:Tracking Technologies Drive Down the Cost of Precisionalready done that. For example, during the recent mad
cow beef recall, one supermarket chain used its pre-
ferred customer cards to identify and warn shoppers who
had bought the suspect meat (Anderson, 2004).
Likewise, credit card information could be used to track
purchases of contaminated foods. In fact, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has used credit card infor-
mation in its traceback investigations. 
The benefits of precise traceability for food safety and
quality control are greater the higher the likelihood and
cost of safety or quality failures. Where the likelihood
and cost of failure are high, manufacturers have large
financial incentives to reduce the size of the standard
recall lot and to adopt a more precise traceability system.
The likelihood of failure differs among food industries
because some foods are more perishable or more suscep-
tible to contamination than others. The costs of safety or
quality breaches also vary among firms because the value
of products and the value of firms’ reputations vary. For
high-value products, recall costs per item are higher than
for low-value products. For firms with valuable reputa-
tions, the costs of recall or safety breaches are higher
than for firms with little name-brand equity. The costs of
safety or quality failures may also be larger in industries
where government or consumer-group oversight is more
stringent, meaning that the likelihood of detection in the
case of a food safety problem is greater. 
The benefits of traceability are also likely to be high if
other options for safety control are few. If a firm can
eliminate safety problems with a simple kill step or
through inexpensive testing, then the marginal benefits
of a traceability system for monitoring safety are likely
to be small. For example, if a firm could use a chemical
dip on incoming produce that completely eliminated the
risk of pathogen contamination, there would be little
value in a traceability system to identify producers of
product with high levels of pathogen contamination.
Likewise, if safety or quality problems are unlikely to
arise in a specific stretch of the production or supply
chain, there is little value in establishing traceability sys-
tems for that stretch. 
Another benefit of traceability systems is that they may
help firms establish the extent of their liability in cases of
food safety failure and potentially shift liability to others
in the supply chain. If a firm can produce documentation
to establish that safety failure did not occur in its plant,
then it may be able to protect itself from liability or other
negative consequences. Traceability systems in them-
selves do not determine liability, but because they pro-
vide information about the production process, including
safety procedures, they have a role in providing evidence
of negligence or improper production practices. 
Despite the important safety role they play, traceability
systems are, however, only one element of a firm’s over-
all safety/quality control system and are designed to
complement and reinforce the other elements of the safe-
ty/quality system. In themselves, traceability systems do
not produce safer or high-quality products—or determine
liability. Traceability systems provide information about
whether control points in the production or supply chain
are operating correctly or not. The breadth, depth, and
precision of traceability systems for safety and quality
necessarily reflect the control points in the overall safe-
ty/quality system and vary systematically across indus-
tries and over time depending on safety and quality tech-
nologies and innovations. 
Objective/Benefits 3: Traceability To Differentiate and
Market Foods with Credence Attributes  The U.S.
food industry is a powerhouse producer of homogenous
bulk commodities such as wheat, corn, soybeans, and
meats. Increasingly, the industry has also begun produc-
ing goods and services tailored to the tastes and prefer-
ences of various segments of the consumer population. In
the competition over micromarkets, producers try to dif-
ferentiate one product from otherwise similar products in
ways that matter to customers. 
Food producers differentiate products over a wide variety
of quality attributes including taste, texture, nutritional
content, cultivation techniques, and origin. Consumers
can easily detect some attributes—green ketchup is hard
to miss. However, other innovations involve credence
attributes, characteristics that consumers cannot discern
even after consuming the product (Darby and Karni,
1973). Consumers cannot, for example, taste or other-
wise distinguish between oil made from GE corn and oil
made from conventional corn. 
Credence attributes can be content or process:
Content attributes affect the physical properties of a
product, although they can be difficult for consumers
to perceive. For example, consumers are unable to
determine the amount of isoflavones in a glass of
soymilk or the amount of calcium in a glass of
enriched orange juice by drinking these beverages. 
Process attributes do not affect final product content
but refer to characteristics of the production process.
Process attributes include country-of-origin, free-
range, dolphin-safe, shade-grown, earth-friendly, and
fair trade. In general, neither consumers nor special-
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Traceability is an indispensable part of any market for
process credence attributes—or content attributes that are
difficult or costly to measure. The only way to verify the
existence of these attributes is through a bookkeeping
record that establishes their creation and preservation.
For example, tuna caught with dolphin-safe nets can be
distinguished from tuna caught using other methods only
through the bookkeeping system that ties the dolphin-
safe tuna to the observer on the boat from which the tuna
was caught. No test conducted on a can of tuna could
detect whether the tuna was caught using dolphin-safe
technologies. Without traceability as evidence of value,
no viable market could exist for dolphin-safe tuna, fair-
trade coffee, non-GE corn oil, or any other process cre-
dence attribute. 
The benefits of traceability (and third-party verification)
for credence attributes are greater the more valuable the
attribute is to processors or final consumers. Attributes
tend to be more valuable the more marketable they are,
the higher the expected premiums, and the larger the
potential market. Firms will only find it worthwhile to
establish traceability to market attributes with the poten-
tial to generate additional revenue—and the larger the
potential revenue, the greater the benefits of traceability. 
Costs of Traceability
Traceability costs include the costs of recordkeeping and
product differentiation. Recordkeeping costs are those
incurred in the collection and maintenance of informa-
tion on product attributes as they move through produc-
tion and distribution channels. In some cases, the record-
keeping system necessary for traceability is very similar
to that already maintained by the firm for accounting or
other purposes. For example, in the United States, most
firms keep records of their receipts and bills. For these
firms, one-up, one-down traceability for a standard set of
attributes would require little if any change in the firm’s
accounting system. In other instances, new traceability
objectives may require expensive additions to existing
recordkeeping systems. 
Product differentiation costs are those incurred in keep-
ing products or sets of product attributes separate from
one another for tracking purposes. Product differentiation
for tracking is primarily achieved by breaking product
flow into lots or any other discrete unit defined over a set
of common processes or content attributes (see box,
“What’s a Lot?”). When traceability requirements
accommodate production-based lot sizes such as the
amount of production from one shift or the product from
one field, traceability differentiation costs are minimal.
Likewise, when new traceability objectives accommodate
differentiation systems that are already in place for other
traceability objectives, the costs of the new traceability
systems will be relatively small. 
When traceability differentiation requires firms to adopt
different or additional criteria for product differentiation,
firms could incur large costs—at least in the short run.
Such a situation may arise when firms instigate trace-
ability for new credence attributes. For example, the
desire to distinguish GE corn from conventional corn
has prompted a number of growers and processors to
establish new systems to identify and keep the two types
of corn separate. 
The longrun cost of separating products with different
attributes depends on a number of factors, including
underlying production technologies and the level of
demand. In some cases, a change or addition to existing
production lines is the low-cost solution to meet
demand. For example, a packer-shipper may determine
that installing scanner equipment on conveyer belts to
separate fruit by color or size is the most efficient tech-
nology. In other cases, firms may choose to differentiate
production by establishing separate product lines within
the same plant or by sequencing production and thor-
oughly cleaning production facilities between differenti-
ated product batches. A packer-shipper could run lines at
separate times for conventional and organic produce or
build separate lines for each attribute. Firms facing large
demand may dedicate a whole plant or distribution chan-
nel to the production or distribution of one specific
product line. Average costs increase when the separation
of product lines creates unused capacity, such as under-
utilized trucks and storage facilities, or requires stop-
ping, cleaning, and restarting production lines. If
demand for the differentiated products is sufficient,
however, the firm may realize economies of scope and
increased net profits.
The level of precision also affects the type and cost of
product differentiation. Systems requiring a high degree
of accuracy also tend to require stringent systems for
separating crops or products. There are two primary
approaches for separating attributes:
 A segregation system separates one crop or batch of
food ingredients from others. Though segregation
implies that specific crops and products are kept apart,
segregation systems do not typically entail a high level
of precision. In the United States, white corn is chan-
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it is segregated from other types of corn. 
 An identity preservation (IP) system identifies the
source and/or nature of the crop or batch of food
ingredients. IP systems are stricter than segregation
systems and often require containerization or other
physical barriers to guarantee that certain traits or
qualities are maintained throughout the food supply
chain. Tofu-quality soybeans are put into containers to
preserve their identity. Produce treated to meet phyto-
sanitary requirements of foreign countries is segregat-
ed by box to preserve its identity. 
The distinction between “IP” and “segregation” is often
blurred and a “strict segregation” system may be more
precise than a loose IP system. Regardless of the exact
terminology, precise systems requiring that products be
strictly separated will likely be more expensive than
others because such systems are usually more expensive
to develop and maintain than loose systems. 
The level of precision of the traceability system may
also influence recordkeeping costs. Recordkeeping
expenses tend to rise with smaller lot sizes. Five tons of
production broken into 5 one-ton lots require less paper-
work than the same quantity broken into 1,000 ten-
pound lots. In addition, the bookkeeping records
required to maintain a highly accurate traceability sys-
tem tend to require more detail and expense than those
for less exacting systems. For example, a traceability
system for stringent pathogen control will require more
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Product differentiation for tracking is achieved by breaking
product flow into lots, or any other discrete unit defined over
a set of common process or content attributes. Lots are the
smallest quantity for which firms keep records. Firms may
choose among an infinite array of unit sizes, shapes, or time,
defining their own lot size by the quantity of product that fits
in a container, that a forklift can move on a pallet, or that fills
a truck.  A lot may be an individual animal or group of ani-
mals, or production from an entire day or shift. Firms that
choose a large lot size for tracking purposes, such as a feed-
lot or grain silo, will have more difficulty isolating safety or
quality problems than a firm that chooses a smaller size. A
smaller lot size, such as an individual cow or container, will
allow greater precision.
In choosing lot size, firms typically consider a number of fac-
tors, including accounting procedures, production technolo-
gies, and transportation. As these factors vary within and
among industries, lot size varies from plant to plant. There is
no standard traceability unit. Furthermore, a firm is likely to
have a different lot size for incoming and outgoing products.
Firms add value in their production and marketing practices
by commingling, transforming, and processing products.
Clearly the incoming products for a meat processor and
slaughterhouse (for example, group of pigs) differ from the
outgoing product (boxes of primal cuts and consumer-ready
products). The size and shape of a lot is therefore likely to
change at each processing juncture. Some firms may find it
efficient to maintain depth of traceability by linking incom-
ing and outgoing lots, while others may not.
Consider two examples. An apple packer-shipper may use
accounting procedures to choose the incoming lot size. The
shipper may receive apples from a number of growers and
must pay each grower based on the type, size, and grade of
the product. Since these attributes are known only after the
apples have been sorted, each grower’s apples need to be kept
separate in the packing line. These accounting procedures
thus influence the lot size of product entering the packing-
house. As apples are sorted, packed, and shipped, a packing-
house may choose to make a lot the number of boxes that can
be loaded onto a truck. One or several growers’apples could
be loaded together—it is most cost-effective to fully pack a
truck. There may be food safety and quality concerns that
motivate a shipper to keep a lot size no larger than a truck-
load.  In the case of a food safety problem—for example, a
piece of metal or glass found in an apple—the shipper may
want to limit the size of a recall and limit the number of
affected growers.
The lot for a farrow-to-finish operation, a farm where pigs
are born, raised, and prepared for slaughter, might be a batch
or group of pigs. When the batch is moved from one stage of
production to another, the all-in, all-out production system
allows for cleaning the facilities between batches. This
method meets the farmer’s objective of preventing disease
from spreading from one batch of pigs to another (Hayes and
Meyer, 2003). Commingling batches of pigs raises the poten-
tial for disease. The slaughterhouse may process several
batches of pigs in a shift or day, packing the outgoing prod-
uct—various cuts of pork—in boxes. Each box may specify
the name and address of the packer, the lot number, and place
and time of production, allowing the firm to track similar
products. This reflects the packer’s objective of efficiently
managing large volumes of meat and concern for food safe-
ty. If the packer or Federal or State authorities discover that
there is contaminated pork, they can identify product by lot
number and inform retailers and/or consumers.
What’s A Lot?sampling, testing, and verification paperwork than a sys-
tem designed for less stringent control. 
Both recordkeeping and differentiation expenses tend to
rise with the complexity of the production and distribu-
tion systems. Products that undergo a large number of
transformations on their way to market generate a lot of
new information and are typically more difficult to track
than products with little processing. Food products vary
considerably with respect to the number of handlers and
manufacturers and the degree of commingling and pro-
cessing. Lettuce picked in the field and sold directly to
retailers is relatively easy to track. Tracking a chicken
potpie is more challenging. The process of transforming
the wheat to wheat flour, the chicken and the vegetables
to bite size pieces, and combining all the raw ingredients
into a pie generates a trail of numerous different lots that
themselves are composed of commingled lots. 
Products that are bought and sold numerous times also
tend to generate higher bookkeeping and differentiation
expenses than those that remain within the same compa-
ny. Any time product is passed from one firm to another,
new paperwork is generated as firms link receipts with
product and reconcile or adjust lot numbers and sizes.
New coding and software technologies are helping to
drive down the costs of linking supply-management
records across the food chain and of coordinating the
flow of product along the chain. In many sectors of the
food supply chain, new information technologies are
helping push down the cost of recordkeeping and stimu-
lating investment in traceability systems. As mentioned
before, electronic systems for tracking inventory, pur-
chases, production, and sales are becoming an integral
part of doing business in the United States. 
Vertical integration and contracting are other methods
for reducing the costs of tracing and supply manage-
ment. Vertically integrated firms and firms that contract
along the supply chain for specific attributes are often
better able to coordinate production, transportation, pro-
cessing, and marketing. They are able to respond to con-
sumer preferences for select quality attributes and pro-
vide consistency of product. Vertically integrated firms
can also adopt the same recordkeeping system across the
chain to streamline product coordination. Thus, these
food suppliers can attain value and limit the cost of
traceability systems. 
Benefits and Costs Vary 
Across Industries and Time
The development of traceability systems throughout the
food supply system reflects a dynamic balancing of ben-
efits and costs. Though many firms operate traceability
systems for supply management, quality control, and
product differentiation, these objectives have played dif-
ferent roles in driving the development of traceability
systems in different sectors of the food supply system.
In some sectors, food scares have been the primary
motivation pushing firms to establish traceability sys-
tems; in others, the growth in demand for high-value
attributes has pushed firms to differentiate and track
attributes; in yet other sectors, supply management has
been the key driving force in the creation of traceability
systems. Different types and levels of costs, reflecting
differences in industry organization, production process-
es, and distribution and accounting systems affect trace-
ability adoption. 
The dynamic interplay of objectives, benefits, and costs
has spurred different rates of investment in breadth,
depth, and precision of traceability across sectors—and
continues to do so. Table 1 summarizes key factors
affecting the benefits and costs of traceability systems.
These factors vary across industries and across time,
reflecting market dynamics, technological advances, and
changes in consumer preferences. Changes in the factors
influence traceability benefits and costs, thereby influ-
encing the private sector’s tracking capabilities. 
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Factors affecting benefits
 The higher the value of coordination along the supply
chain, the larger the benefits of traceability for supply-side
management
 The larger the market, the larger the benefits of traceability
for supply side management, safety and quality control, and
credence attribute marketing
 The higher the value of the food product, the larger the
benefits of traceability for safety and quality control 
 The higher the likelihood of safety or quality failures, the
larger the benefits of reducing the extent of failure with
traceability systems for safety and quality control
 The higher the penalty for safety or quality failures, where
penalties include loss of market, legal expenses, or govern-
ment-mandated fines, the greater the benefits of reducing
the extent of safety or quality failures with traceability 
 The higher the expected premiums, the larger the benefits
of traceability for credence attribute marketing 
Factors affecting costs
 The wider the breadth of traceability, the more information
to record and the higher the costs of traceability 
 The greater the depth and the number of transactions, the
higher the costs of traceability
 The greater the precision, the smaller and more exacting
the tracking units, the higher the costs of traceability 
 The greater the degree of product transformation, the more
complex the traceability system, the higher the costs of
traceability 
 The larger the number of new segregation or identity
preservation activities, the higher the costs of traceability 
 The larger the number of new accounting systems and pro-
cedures, the more expensive the start-up costs of traceabil-
ity
 The greater the technological difficulties of tracking, the
higher the cost of traceability
Table 1—Major factors affecting the costs and benefits of traceabilityThe history of traceability in the produce industry dates
back to the early part of the 20th century. The develop-
ment of refrigerated railcars in the late 1800s allowed
produce from the West and other distant areas to be
shipped to the major eastern population centers. As a
result, local spot market produce sales with face-to-face
transactions where both buyer and seller could verify the
quality at the same time became less common. Instead,
transactions over long distances became the norm
(Dimitri, 2001). Problems began to arise due to the high
perishability and fragility of most produce: produce qual-
ity could change substantially in transit. When produce
deteriorated, it was not clear where the responsibility
lay—the grower, shipper, transportation firm, intermedi-
aries, or buyer. When delivered quality was less than
expected, buyers demanded price adjustments. These
long-distance transactions also introduced more interme-
diaries into the marketing chain. Buyers and sellers need-
ed a system to verify quality at various points in the mar-
keting chain and establish their legal rights in the case of
a disputed transaction. 
In response to these problems, produce growers urged
Congress to provide legislation to regulate marketing
practices for their industry, and in 1930 Congress passed
the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA).
One part of the Act focused on recordkeeping require-
ments in produce transactions for shippers selling on
behalf of growers—the most common marketing arrange-
ment for fresh produce. The recordkeeping system pro-
vides growers with a paper trail to ensure they receive
the proper price for their produce. A shipper must assign
a lot number, or other positive identification, to all loads
received so as to segregate and track produce from differ-
ent growers from receipt of the product until the first
sale. PACA regulations for shipper recordkeeping estab-
lish the first link in the fresh produce traceability system
at the shipper level. 
More recently, the impetus for further developing trace-
ability systems for produce has come from the industry’s
concerns about food safety. In the event of a foodborne
illness outbreak, damage can be limited if the contami-
nated product can be identified quickly, allowing other
noncontaminated product to be marketed. In the mid-
1990s a series of well-publicized outbreaks, traced back
to microbial contamination of produce, raised public
awareness of potential problems. In response, FDA
developed voluntary guidelines for good agricultural
practices (GAPs) for reducing the potential for microbial
contamination of produce. One part of the guidelines
focuses on improving traceability. Some retailers now
want their produce growers to comply with GAPs and to
provide third-party audits to verify compliance. Some
farmers voluntarily provide these audits already. Third-
party audits reduce the asymmetric information inherent
in a transaction where food safety attributes are not obvi-
ous. But this new concern requires more traceback infor-
mation than required by PACA. In a food safety crisis,
retailers and the food service industry are concerned
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III. Industry Studies:
Private-Sector Traceability Systems Balance 
Private Costs and Benefits
In this section, we examine the development of traceability systems in three food sectors in
the United States: fresh produce, grains and oilseeds, and cattle/beef. We describe the
breadth, depth, and precision of each sector’s traceability system and examine the influence
that varying costs and benefits have had in the development of traceability in these sectors.
We find that traceability systems are rapidly developing as traceability benefits increase in
value and as technology drives down the cost of creating and managing information. We
also find that the dynamic balancing of benefits and costs has led to wide variation in the
development of traceability systems in the three food sectors. 
Fresh Produce
The development of traceability systems in the fresh produce industry has been greatly
influenced by the characteristics of the product. Perishability of and quality variation in
fresh fruit and vegetables necessitate the boxing and identification of quality attributes
early in the supply chain, either in the field or packinghouse. This has facilitated tracing
capability for a number of objectives, including marketing, food safety, supply manage-
ment, and differentiation of new quality attributes. about identifying the shipper of a contaminated product
but shippers and growers require more precision to
uncover the source of the contamination problem and
resolve it. Some have begun to track information on
exactly where a product comes from—down to a part of
a field in some cases. 
The costs of establishing and maintaining traceability
systems are generally lower for perishable produce than
for other commodities because of the way produce is
packaged. Most fresh produce is sold in small well-
marked containers (generally boxes), as opposed to bulk
sales, because much of it is easily damaged and must be
protected during shipment. Containers are so small that
they generally contain produce from only one grower.
Compare this to the nut or dried bean industry, where
the products can be stored in silos without damage until
they are packed. In these industries, which are not cov-
ered by PACA since they are not considered perishable,
product from more than one supplier may be mixed
together in a silo. 
Because produce is packed in boxes, the industry can
easily segregate products with different characteristics of
concern to buyers. Segregating various types of products
has always been important to the produce industry.
Unlike grains or meat, fresh produce is a consumer-ready
product. Size and appearance matter. For some com-
modities, variety is also important. For example, a large
Washington apple shipper today could be selling over
3,000 distinct apple products that vary by variety, grade,
size, packaging, and other characteristics. Segregation is
a necessity. The variation in products is also increasing.
In 1987, the typical U.S. supermarket carried 173 pro-
duce items. By 2001, the number had grown to 350. The
well-established ability to segregate and trace fruit and
vegetables has allowed the produce industry to adjust rel-
atively easily to new products with different characteris-
tics such as organic or no-pesticide-residue items.
Tracing Produce 
Through the Marketing Chain
Figure 4 presents a diagram of the marketing chain for
produce. In 2002, U.S. growers produced fruit and veg-
etables (both fresh and processed) worth $24.5 billion
(see table 2). In general, growers can market their pro-
duce through shippers, sell it directly to consumers at
farmers’markets and roadside stands, or sell it to proces-
sors. Shippers may sell directly to retailers and the food
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Shippersservice industry (restaurants, hospitals, military institu-
tions, schools, etc.) or to a range of market intermediaries
who in turn sell to retailers and the food service industry.
In 1997, 48 percent of fresh produce consumed in the
United States was purchased at retail and 50 percent at
food service establishments (Kaufman et al., 2000). 
Direct sales to consumers are small, accounting for only
about 2 percent of final fresh produce consumption in
1997. On the other hand, processing is an important part
of the produce industry. In 2002, 86 percent of vegeta-
bles and 69 percent of fruit produced in the United
States, by weight, went to processing. Trade is also
important for the fresh produce industry. In 2002, fresh
imports totaled 28 percent of the value of fruit and veg-
etable production, and the export share was 16 percent.
Shippers and market intermediaries both import produce
directly from foreign suppliers. Shippers may also sell
directly to the export market or to intermediaries who
then sell to that market. 
This chapter focuses on fresh produce that is marketed
by shippers. Fresh produce is more difficult to trace than
a processed fruit or vegetable. A processed product, like
a can of tomatoes in a consumer’s cupboard, carries a
wealth of traceback information embedded in its label
and its product code printed on the bottom of the can
(see box, “Traceability for Processed Fruit and
Vegetables”). A fresh tomato on a consumer’s countertop
may display no identifying information at all. This chap-
ter discusses how the produce industry provides trace-
ability in a challenging environment.  
The Grower to Shipper Link—
Including Exports and Imports
The traceability chain begins with the grower to shipper
link. Growers and shippers generally make marketing
agreements before production begins. Growers want to be
sure that someone is committed to selling their produce
on their behalf. The shipper may want growers to follow
specific practices since any problems traced back to the
grower would damage the shipper’s reputation too. The
shipper markets the grower’s produce and returns the pro-
ceeds to the grower after deducting the agreed-upon fees. 
Typically, shippers market for growers and are covered
by PACA regulations requiring produce to be identified
by lot and accounted for until the first sale. PACA does
not require a lot number to be marked on a box although
many shippers do so. Also, PACA does not specify the
size of a lot, it just requires that it be adequate to pro-
vide correct payment to growers. Lots can vary depend-
ing on the needs of the shipper and grower. At one end
of the spectrum, a lot could be one grower’s entire pro-
duction of a particular crop over the length of a season.
But identifying lots by smaller production units can be
an important business tool. For example, a grower with
several apple orchards may want each to be a separate
lot to be able to compare yields with different produc-
tion practices. From a food safety perspective, it is also
important to narrow down where a contaminated product
comes from and limit potential losses. If all contaminat-
ed product comes from a lot representing one orchard, a
grower may be able to continue marketing from the oth-
ers. On the other hand, there are diminishing benefits to
precision. No one traces apples back to a particular tree.
So far, there is no reason to do so. The costs would be
high, and the benefits, compared to just being able to
trace back to an orchard block (or part of one), would
appear to be negligible, if not zero. Most things that
would affect apples would generally affect more than
one tree. So if an apple from a particular block had a
problem, the entire block would be treated to be sure the
problem was resolved. 
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Table 2—U.S. fruit and vegetable industry, 2002
Production Imports Exports
$ billion million tons $ billion $ billion
Vegetables1 13.7 21.4 3.3 1.8
Fresh 3.0
Processed 18.4
Fruit2 10.8 35.6 3.6 2.1
Fresh 10.9
Processed 24.7
1 Vegetable trade numbers include fresh and frozen vegetables.
2 Fruit production numbers contain information for 2002 for the noncitrus industry and the 2001/2002 season for the citrus industry. Fruit
imports include fresh and frozen but exports include just fresh.
Sources: Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts, NASS; Citrus Fruits, NASS; Vegetables, NASS; Potatoes, NASS; and FATUS, ERS.PACA also does not specify the form of the recordkeep-
ing or accounting system. Some systems are quite
sophisticated and others less so, depending on the firm’s
capabilities and needs. A large company may have a
state-of-the-art computer system. In some cases, retailers
require their suppliers to use specific computer software
to aid invoicing or electronic ordering and other procure-
ment activities. A smaller company may have a less com-
plex system. Some firms do not need much information.
If they sell produce for just a few growers or sell to a lim-
ited number of buyers, a simple system may be adequate.
PACA establishes the depth of traceability in the fresh
produce industry—generally produce can be traced back
to the individual grower. But there are some exceptions.
For example, growers may agree to pool their produce
and receive an average price for the pooled product. In
this case, traceback would be less precise, going back to
a small group of growers rather than the actual grower. If
produce is sold and then repacked by another shipper or
market intermediary, PACA laws would not apply, and
the origin of the produce could be lost if careful records
were not kept. However, in a traceback situation, a
repacker could identify the sources of the different items
packed on a particular day and narrow the search to sev-
eral growers.  
Shippers who do not sell on behalf of growers are not
covered by PACA requirements to identify produce by
lot. These include vertically integrated grower/shippers
who market only their own production. However, most
grower/shippers market for at least a few other growers.
Produce purchased by shippers instead of marketed for
growers would also not be covered. Both of these groups
are probably quite small. But the general business bene-
fits of a traceability system are so great that most firms
likely maintain a level of traceability even if not required
to do so.
At harvest time, growers send their produce for the fresh
market to shippers. Some fruit and vegetables are har-
vested and transported to a central packinghouse or shed
for cleaning, grading, and boxing. Apples, citrus, stone
fruit, tomatoes, and potatoes are examples of crops that
are shed-packed. When a grower brings in a load of fruit
or vegetables to a central packinghouse, the packing line
is cleared of all other loads. The grower’s whole load
then goes through the packing line all at once or, in the
case of storable products, like apples or potatoes, the
produce may first go into storage until packing at a later
date. Information about how much is graded into differ-
ent qualities and sizes, including culls, is recorded for
each lot. The shipper may also collect other data on the
lot such as specific field or orchard, pickers, harvest date,
etc. This information facilitates payment to the grower,
operations management, and, if necessary, traceback. The
shipper packs and labels the cartons, usually with an ink
jet printer.
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There is a critical difference in traceability between fresh and
processed fruit and vegetables. Each processed item a con-
sumer buys is generally individually identified unlike fresh
produce. For example, when the consumer gets a fresh toma-
to home, he may not know where it came from, but a canned
tomato product will be labeled and almost always has a prod-
uct code. Processed products often have consumer-recognized
brand names that are also helpful in a traceback situation even
if the can or other container is no longer available. 
Produce for processing is usually contracted for in advance
with very specific requirements for varieties, production
practices, and harvest time. The processor may harvest the
product and take it directly to the processing facility. Like the
fresh shipper, the processor records information about the
grower and field for all arrivals. Each load is processed and
the time noted by the processor. PACA rules apply for fresh-
cut produce like bagged salads and frozen produce, but
canned fruit and vegetables are generally exempt.
For canned tomatoes, for example, the recordkeeping chal-
lenge is to link the fresh tomatoes coming in to the canned
tomatoes going out. Product codes are an important compo-
nent of traceability. In the canned-tomato case, a product
code would generally be inkjet printed or embossed on the
bottom of the can. Then a firm would be able to say that the
finished product with a certain range of product codes corre-
sponds to fresh tomatoes processed at a certain time that
came from a particular grower.  
FDA provides guidelines for product codes that would aid a
firm with a potential recall situation, but there are no require-
ments to use product codes. However, the benefits of product
codes are so great that most firms use some kind of product
code. A typical product code might contain information such
as firm, plant, line, date, and time. If there is a recall, FDA
needs to know which product is a problem. If firms cannot
identify particular product codes that are contaminated, FDA
would have no alternative but to recall all the firm’s products.
Firms want to keep any potential recall as small as possible,
which requires more precise identification information. A
firm would have to balance the costs of more precise infor-
mation with the cost of a potential recall to determine the
appropriate amount of information.
Traceability for Processed Fruit and VegetablesOther fruit and vegetables are packed in the field. For
example, lettuce, berries, broccoli, and melons are typi-
cally harvested, wrapped, and boxed in the field. The
shipper uses stickers on each box, or on each pallet of
boxes, that generally identify the grower, packing crew,
and date. Handheld ink jet printers are available for use
in field packing but are used infrequently because they
are expensive. 
Containers are printed with various types of information
relevant to different people along the marketing chain.
Pallets of boxes may also be labeled. Because fresh pro-
duce is not transformed before it gets to the consumer
(unlike grains and livestock), it is easy to add stickers,
tags, and other special labels to the produce to appeal
directly to consumers. Each of these methods of identify-
ing produce is discussed below. The exact type of infor-
mation provided will depend on various laws that apply
and the needs of the shipper and buyer. 
Information on Boxes  PACA does not require any
information on boxes, just that everything printed on the
box be true. In practice, boxes provide a wealth of infor-
mation, some required by law and some voluntary.
Typically, States require that certain information be
included on a box. For example, California State law
requires each produce box to identify the commodity and
variety, responsible party (entity, town, and State), and
quantity (weight, count, or size). 
Although not required, most shippers voluntarily mark
boxes with lot numbers. It is easier to look up records
by lot number than to have to search through other
records to identify a particular grower’s product. FDA
would like to see growers also add lot information to
invoices to help speed up traceback in a food safety out-
break (FDA, 1998). If a shipper is selling only for him-
self and a neighbor and can keep the boxes separate,
there would be no need for lot numbers on boxes.
Recordkeeping alone could indicate whose boxes were
sold to which buyer.
In addition to ensuring proper payment, the traceability
system that identifies boxes by lot can also be important
for general business operations because not all produce is
of equal quality. For example, if someone liked a particu-
lar purchase and wanted more from the same grower, a
shipper would need to know whose product, identified by
lot number, was sent. Alternatively, if a product does not
hold up well and a buyer complains, a shipper wants to
know which grower’s product was involved. The shipper
may dock the price for that load, decide to not ship for
that grower again, or ship only to nearby markets.
Similarly, if produce is exported but fails phytosanitary
inspections because of the presence of pests, an exporter
might request no more loads from the lot with problems. 
Labeling on boxes is important for marketing. Produce
growers and shippers are always looking for ways to dis-
tinguish their product and raise its price above that of an
undifferentiated commodity. Currently there are several
characteristics that consumers are particularly concerned
about. If organic produce is to be marketed as such, it
must be marked to verify that production practices meet
USDA’s organic standards. Similarly, produce with no
pesticide residues can be marked with a third-party certi-
fying seal to verify its status. 
Marketing orders, which allow producers to collectively
regulate certain marketing activities for an industry, may
also require additional label information. A marketing
order may require that shippers market only produce of a
certain quality or size. Quality standards can bolster a
product’s reputation, which benefits all growers in the
order. Restriction of supply can also raise the price for all
producers. This type of program can involve additional
mandatory markings on boxes to ensure that the market-
ing order can regulate the program by identifying pro-
ducers who are not complying and undermining the
integrity of the program.
In the case of California peaches, the marketing order
requires positive lot identification (PLI) which means
that each box of peaches is inspected by a USDA inspec-
tor to verify that the quality meets the marketing order
specifications. The size of the lot is specified in the mar-
keting order and is not necessarily the same lot used by
shippers to comply with PACA. Some marketing orders
require additional information. The California peach
marketing order also requires that each box be marked
with the packinghouse number and date. The additional
information allows the shipper to identify whose product
was packed at that location and time. 
Marketing orders can also be used to provide more preci-
sion in traceback. In addition to individual grower efforts
to improve traceback capabilities, grower organizations
have become more concerned about the reputation of
their crops for food safety. Several grower organizations
have developed systems to strengthen traceability, which
encourages grower responsibility and reduces the free-
rider problem in developing a positive industry reputa-
tion—a public good. In the case of an outbreak, a grower
organization that encourages traceback can prove to the
public that their product is not responsible for the prob-
lem. Or, when the industry is responsible for the out-
break, the problem grower or growers can be identified
and damage can be limited to that group. The California
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back system to deal with potential food safety issues (see
box, “Cantaloupe Industry’s Response to Food Safety
Problems”). 
Another set of mandatory labels relates to products
exported to other countries. Produce that is grown or
treated for export may be required to bear a mark from
USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ver-
ifying that the product meets certain phytosanitary provi-
sions. Foreign countries requiring the phytosanitary pro-
visions would not accept a box without the correct mark-
ings. In the case of Washington apples, only those that
have passed a cold treatment process may be exported to
Mexico, and boxes must be marked with the number of
the registered treatment facility.
Shippers may also import produce directly to market
with their domestic production as a means to extend
their marketing season or provide more variety in prod-
uct offerings. Almost all imported produce, like domes-
tic produce, is marketed on behalf of the foreign grow-
ers so the transactions are also covered by PACA.
Typically, the produce is packed and labeled in the for-
eign country to comply with U.S. labeling requirements,
but it may be repacked in the United States as well. The
only additional labeling requirement for a box of
imported fresh produce is that it show a country-of-ori-
gin label. For produce in consumer-ready containers,
such as raspberries in plastic boxes, grapes in bags, and
shrink-wrapped greenhouse cucumbers, each container
must be labeled with the country of origin. 
Information on Pallet Tags  After initial packing, boxes
are formed into pallets, and a pallet tag with a barcode is
sometimes attached. The number of shippers using pallet
tags is increasing. Pallet tags are for internal accounting
and logistics; they are not required by law. The tags
reflect shipper needs. A typical pallet tag might indicate
the date packed, packing shift, grower, lot number, vari-
ety, grade, style of pack, and size. Pallet tags allow staff
moving pallets in cold storage with forklifts to easily find
the exact product they are looking for without having to
read the small print on the boxes. Scannable pallet tags
are also used to verify that orders contain the correct
products. Pallet tags are also useful in narrowing the
scope of a quality or food safety problem beyond just the
lot. If the only problem products in a lot were on a pallet
shipped to one distribution center, the focus of the inves-
tigation would concentrate on contamination sometime
after the pallet left the shipper. If the only problem pal-
lets from the lot were packed during a particular shift at
the packinghouse, some kind of postharvest contamina-
tion might be suspected. While there are voluntary
Universal Code Council standards for pallet tags, very
few U.S. produce firms use them. Most barcodes are
internal systems that can be read only by the shipper.
Pallet tags are discussed again below. 
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Beginning in 2000, the California Cantaloupe Advisory
Board (a marketing order for California cantaloupe grown
north of Bakersfield) began requiring additional traceback
information on cantaloupe boxes as part of the State market-
ing order (this program was voluntary in 1999). This was not
a very difficult process. California cantaloupe is field-packed
and the Board had already contracted with the California
Department of Food and Agriculture to inspect cantaloupe
during harvest for quality control and apply an inspection
sticker to every box (growers pay the Board a per-box fee for
this service). Cantaloupe from this area cannot be sold with-
out the sticker identifying the county and shipper. 
The new program requires information on the packing date,
field, and packing crew which allows a grower to trace a
problem back to a particular part of a field. This would
allow a grower to determine if contamination perhaps orig-
inated with a sanitation problem with a particular packing
crew or was more widespread and perhaps originated with
irrigation water. Some growers had already been providing
this additional information on a voluntary basis. Adding
this additional traceback information to the box was neither
particularly costly nor complicated. It did take some admin-
istrative changes, however. To be able to require traceback,
the members of the Board had to propose a change to the
marketing order and vote on it. The original marketing
order covered grades and quality standards. 
The new marketing order specifically approves “such grade
and quality standards of cantaloupes as necessary, including
the marking or certification of cantaloupes or their shipping
containers to expedite and implement industry practices
related to food safety” (California Department of Food and
Agriculture, 2003). If a foodborne illness outbreak were to
occur, this program would allow the industry to immediately
confirm or deny that the problem is due to California can-
taloupe and help growers pinpoint the source of the problem.
This may be the only grower-organized program for produce
in the United States that requires such detailed traceback
information on each box. To date, the system has not been
necessary for a food safety outbreak.
Cantaloupe Industry’s Response to Food Safety ProblemsInformation on Individual Produce Items  By the time
fresh produce reaches retailer shelves, many products
have lost their identity. A bin of loose potatoes is com-
pletely anonymous unless displayed in its shipping box.
But some products do retain at least some of their identi-
ty—potatoes packed in bags, bagged salads, berries in
plastic consumer-ready containers, and items, such as
bananas, that are marked with stickers emblazoned with
their brands. The trends toward more fresh-cut produce,
consumer-ready packaging, and branded products ensure
a continued increase in the information available to con-
sumers when selecting fresh produce. In 1997, 19 percent
of retail produce sales were branded products, compared
with only 7 percent in 1987 (Kaufman et al., 2000). 
Retailers often request that fruit and vegetables sold
loose (as opposed to those in consumer-ready packages
like a bag of carrots) carry stickers with the product’s
price-look-up (PLU) code. Stickers work relatively well
for some products such as large tomatoes and apples.
Stickers do not adhere as well to other products with a
rough texture such as cantaloupe. Some products, such
as chili peppers, are too small to use stickers although
they could be packaged instead of being sold loose and
then a sticker could be applied. The primary motivation
for PLU codes on loose produce is to ensure that the
retail cashier rings up the right price code for each item
and charges the right price—identification of the item,
not traceability per se. Shippers charge for this service.
Some shippers use stickers with their company, brand
name, or additional product attributes, as well as the
PLU code. This can also convey useful information to
the savvy consumer. For example, greenhouse tomatoes
sold loose in bins usually have stickers with the firm
name applied. Consumers may prefer one firm’s toma-
toes to another’s. Such information could prove useful in
a food safety traceback situation, if consumers paid
attention to it. 
Since the only product information for produce sold
loose that actually reaches the consumer is the PLU
sticker, there is some interest in trying to put more trace-
ability information on it. Retailers want scannable PLU
stickers to reduce labor costs and cash register keying
errors. With reduced space symbology (RSS), additional
information such as a shipper code, and perhaps even lot,
could be incorporated into a barcode. There are, however,
constraints to sticker size and the amount of information
that can be included. The newest stickers also require
newer scanning machines; that requirement could delay
retail adoption of RSS. 
The Shipper to Retailer or Food Service
Establishment Link—Direct Sales and 
Intermediate Sales 
Shippers sell produce to a wide range of final commer-
cial customers—retailers and food service establish-
ments—and market intermediaries. If a shipper sells
directly to a retailer or a food service buyer (an increas-
ing trend in the industry), traceability can be straightfor-
ward since PACA requires recordkeeping to the first
buyer. Recent research shows that shippers’ share of sales
made directly to retailers and mass merchandisers
increased between 1994 and 1999. For example, 63 per-
cent of total grape sales and 54 percent of orange sales
were direct sales in 1999, up from 60 percent and 48 per-
cent, respectively, in 1994 (Calvin et al., 2001).
While the shipper has a wealth of information about the
product, only a limited amount of information is for-
warded to commercial buyers in accounting records.
Information on the box and pallet is generally not
entered into the buyer’s database since it is not in a stan-
dardized machine-readable form. The commercial buyer
creates a new tracking system. The link between the
shipper and buyer databases is the purchase order num-
ber for each transaction. If the buyer calls up about an
order and has the purchase order number, the shipper can
access all his records about the product including lot and
pallet numbers. 
As a commercial buyer receives each load, information is
entered into the firm’s data system that tracks the entry
and eventual disposition of the product. For example, a
large retailer might have a central warehouse that
receives produce from shippers and then distributes pro-
duce in smaller volume to its local stores. The more
sophisticated distribution centers add new internal pallet
tags specific to the retailer’s tracing system. For example,
it would link to information on the purchase order num-
ber, the date of receipt for use in rotation of the stock,
and information on storage location in the warehouse.
The pallets received from the shipper may be broken
down and then reformed into mixed pallets (a pallet of
different products and/or different suppliers) to be
shipped off to a local retail store or food service firm.
The outgoing pallets also need pallet tags. These outgo-
ing tags do not, however, link individual boxes back to
their purchase order number, so the commercial buyer
does not necessarily know which suppliers’ product went
where. In a traceback, commercial buyers would look
through their records to see what they had in stock in the
warehouse during the relevant time period, identify the
purchase order numbers associated with that product, and
contact the shippers. If there is only one supplier, there is
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more difficult. 
In foodborne illness cases where there is more than one
supplier, multiple outbreaks may provide additional
information to identify the source of contamination.
Consider a hypothetical example of a traceback where
multiple outbreaks would help to pinpoint the most likely
source of contaminated product (see figure 5).  Looking
at just the Food Service Outlet or just Retailer 2, both of
which received produce from multiple sources, would
provide insufficient information to allow FDA to deter-
mine the source of contamination. Looking at both
together, however, shows that Shipper 4 is likely to be
the source of the problem. If FDA had information only
on Retailer 1, which received produce from just one
shipper, that information alone would be sufficient to
identify the probable source. 
Better traceback requires a system that maps out the
exact path a box of produce follows through the distribu-
tion center. If there were a standardized machine-read-
able data system, the shipper’s pallet tag could be read as
the pallet entered the system and linked to the buyer’s
pallet tag to carry data such as shipper pallet and lot
number. Similarly, as boxes left the buyer in new mixed
pallets, the lot information on the box could be tracked to
record exactly where that box went. If such a system
were in place, a food safety problem in a particular store
could be uniquely linked back to the distribution center
and the original shipper’s pallet, lot, and purchase order. 
There is growing recognition in the industry of the poten-
tial efficiency gains from developing a traceability sys-
tem that is standardized across individuals up and down
the marketing chain. The U.S. Produce Marketing
Association and the Canadian Produce Marketing
Association are collaborating to develop a strategy for
adopting the UCC.EAN standardized barcode system.
Bolstering the shipper-commercial buyer link involves
standardized machine-readable information on pallet tags
and boxes (The Packer, 2003). 
In a more complicated transaction, produce may also
pass through other hands, including one or more interme-
diaries such as brokers, wholesalers, repackers, terminal
markets, or exporters before reaching the final point of
consumer sale. These indirect sales can sometimes pose
traceability challenges. Nearly all firms in the produce
marketing chain require a PACA license which imposes
recordkeeping requirements, but each layer of transaction
adds another chance for human error, and a different
tracking system may be used at each stage in the market-
ing chain. Traceability depends on the recordkeeping
standards of the market intermediaries. Many of these
intermediaries are large companies with sophisticated
traceability systems that track incoming and outgoing
shipments in the same way that large retailers do. Some
are smaller firms and may have less comprehensive sys-
tems. As produce passes through many hands, the infor-
mation on the box becomes potentially more important
for identifying its source. 
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Figure 5













Wholesaler 3 Wholesaler 4A standardized traceability system up and down the
marketing chain would make traceback for sales with
intermediate buyers much easier. If the last commercial
buyer could identify the lot, pallet, and shipper immedi-
ately, FDA could avoid the delay of having investigators
wade through information on several transactions to
determine the original shipper. 
Certain types of markets can also pose problems for trac-
ing. Terminal wholesale markets, for example, serve a
number of types of buyers: large retailers or food service
firms that need to make an emergency purchase to fill in
a sudden hole in their supplies, small firms that rely on
the terminal market for their main purchases, and side-
walk food stands. The last category, although probably a
very small share of sales, can pose a particular problem
for tracing sales because they are often cash transactions
that are not necessarily well documented. 
Likewise, certain types of market intermediaries (repack-
ing operations for example) can present traceability diffi-
culties. Frequently, tomatoes are sold and shipped from
their production regions to repackers or wholesalers who
ripen, resort, and repackage for uniform color and then
sell to local retailers and food service buyers. On any
day, repackers may use tomatoes from several different
sources to create a new box of tomatoes. In a traceback
situation, a repacker might be unable to identify the exact
grower but could at least identify a small group of grow-
ers whose tomatoes could have been in the box. 
Shippers also sell fresh produce to the food service
industry, either directly to the food service firms or their
specialized warehouses, or via wholesalers and other
intermediaries. Big fast food companies are particularly
concerned about food safety and will often deal directly
with a shipper to ensure the product meets their exact
production standards, which could be specified in a con-
tract. For tomatoes, fast food firms might use an integrat-
ed shipper/repacker (one that is repacking only with its
own tomatoes), which maintains a higher level of trace-
ability than an unaffiliated repacker. But the food service
industry also consists of many small restaurants with
small produce purchases. These firms are probably buy-
ing from wholesalers or other intermediaries. 
To the Consumer
The final step in produce traceability is from the last
commercial buyer—generally the retailer or food service
institution—to the consumer. This can be a weak link in
traceability. Many consumers might be uneasy about the
idea of retailers’ keeping records of what they buy. But
this information is important for traceback, particularly
for a food safety problem. 
Many observable quality issues can be resolved if a con-
sumer returns produce in poor condition to the retailer.
For example, if a consumer brings in a package of
bagged lettuce that has spoiled before its sell-by date,
traceback would also be a routine process since all the
information is printed on the bag. Even a head of lettuce
may have a plastic sleeve with the shipper name or a
twist tie with a firm name to identify its origin.
Traceback for a food safety problem is more problemat-
ic. Food with microbial contamination generally looks
fine. Even testing cannot always pick up contamination
problems because microbial contamination is often spo-
radic and present at low levels. By the time someone
becomes ill and consults a physician, and health authori-
ties identify the contaminated product and the place and
date of purchase (or consumption in the case of food
service institutions), the perishable produce is usually
long gone. Even when the produce comes in consumer-
ready packages, such as a bag of apples marked with the
shipper’s name, the packaging is also usually discarded.
For a branded processed product, consumers may know
that they always buy a particular brand, but for a fresh
product, most people have no idea who provided it. In
cases where the box or other container is no longer avail-
able, traceback relies on good recordkeeping by all the
firms in the marketing chain. 
If the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or
State/local health departments can identify the contami-
nated product and the place and date of purchase, com-
mercial buyers can usually identify the shipper. In the
best case scenario, where a firm was using only one sup-
plier of the problem product on that date, the retailer or
food service firm could call up the shipper, who would
have all the information about the product. But in prac-
tice there can be a lot of uncertainty about whose product
was sold. 
One potential solution to this problem of tracing from the
retailer to the consumer and back is the RSS sticker with
barcode identifying the shipper as well as the PLU code.
If a retailer knew only the day the problem produce item
was sold, the firm could look at all the product sold that
day and perhaps reduce the number of shippers that
could potentially be involved. If a consumer used a con-
sumer purchase card, a retailer might be able to look up
just what the sick consumer bought and know the shipper
to contact. In the case of club stores, where only mem-
bers can make purchases, traceability is more complete. 
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Traceability has been a critical component of the produce
industry for many years. Historically, the perishability of
produce and the potential for deterioration during cross-
country shipment demanded better recordkeeping to
ensure correct payment to growers. Because produce
must be packed in relatively small boxes to minimize
damage, implementation of traceability has also been rel-
atively low cost. The industry is in a much better position
to adapt to new concerns than industries where bulk sales
have been the norm and segregation and traceability
would involve new costs. 
Currently, there are two systems of information
involved in produce. First, there are physical labels on
boxes and sometimes on pallets. For general business
purposes, it is important to be able to identify the prod-
uct in the boxes. There are various State laws requiring
box information, and marketing orders also often
require additional box information. Pallet tags are com-
pletely voluntary. Second, a paper or electronic trail
allows traceback between different links in the market-
ing chain, though each link may use a different trace-
ability system. U.S. and Canadian produce organiza-
tions are looking at ways to promote a universal trace-
ability system between links in the chain. They recom-
mend that shipper name, pallet tag number (if avail-
able), and lot number be part of the paperwork at each
link. This would effectively combine information on
boxes and the paper or electronic trail. Such a system
would require developing a standardized system of bar-
codes or other machine-readable information, as well as
shipper and buyer investment in machines to apply and
read codes. One of the challenges to developing a com-
pelling technical solution that all market participants
would use voluntarily is to ensure that all segments of
the industry can afford the costs of a new system.
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chronicles the growth of an infrastructure built to manage
large flows of product differentiated on a limited number
of variety or class attributes and then blended or
processed to meet quality and safety standards. In most
cases, the blending and homogenization of product
begins as soon as farmers deliver their crop to the local
elevator and continues until the crop is transformed into
animal feed or into the loaf of bread, cereal, or other
grain product on grocery-store shelves. In most cases,
grain and oilseeds are mixed and transformed all along
the chain, so that safety and quality characteristics are
redefined at each step. As a result, processors need infor-
mation on the characteristics of the product as delivered
only from the last stage of processing. The high level of
processing necessary to produce consumer-ready grain
products eliminates most safety and quality problems
stemming from mishandling or contamination early in
the supply chain and often eliminates the need to estab-
lish traceback to the farm for safety or quality reasons.
More recently, consumer and processor demand for spe-
cialty grains, including products not genetically engi-
neered, has introduced the need to differentiate product
over a new set of quality characteristics. In a few cases,
these new quality demands are accompanied by
demands for traceability systems to track product back
to the farm. For the most part, just as it has many times
before, the grain and oilseed infrastructure is adjusting
to accommodate new quality variations and ensure the
delivery of homogeneous product meeting new quality
and safety standards.
From the Farm to the Elevator
With the exception of a small amount of on-farm feed
use (mainly corn), most grains and oilseeds are marketed
through a supply chain that includes country elevators,
sub-terminal elevators, processors, river elevators, export
port elevators, and retailers (fig. 6). This supply chain
handles a wide range of bulk commodities distinguished
by variety or class, such as No. 2 yellow dent corn and
hard red winter, hard red spring, soft red winter, white,
and durum wheat. Large-scale marketing affords efficien-
cies in terms of lower per-unit handling costs.
Conventional Crops
When farmers harvest standardized crops, they usually
store the grains and oilseeds in large storage units (or
bins) on their farms. Crops of a certain type—for exam-
ple, wheat—are typically commingled, even though pro-
ducers may have grown several different varieties. These
may differ in terms of yield, maturity, resistance to
adverse weather conditions (e.g., drought), and other fac-
tors, but often do not have quality attributes valued by
buyers and are not sold at a premium.
Producers sell their crops to local (country) elevators. In
1997, there were 9,378 wholesale handlers (particularly
country and export elevators) of grains and oilseeds
operating in the United States (U.S. Dept. Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 2000). When farmers deliver their
crops to local elevators, they are given receipts that indi-
cate the commodity sold, its weight, price received, time
of purchase, and any premiums or discounts for quality
factors such as extra moisture, damage, pests, or dock-
age (easily removable foreign material). Country eleva-
tors keep this information, thus establishing a record-
keeping link from the product in an elevator at a point in
time to the farmers who supplied the product. An eleva-
tor operator knows the farmers who delivered grain and
oilseeds at that location and the geographic area from
which they came.
This rather imprecise system of traceability from the ele-
vator to the farm is sufficient because quality variations
that may exist at the farm level are mostly eliminated at
the elevator level. The elevator serves as a key quality
control point for the grain supply chain. Elevators clean
each shipment to remove the foreign material and lower
quality kernels or beans. If the moisture level is too high,
the shipment may be dried before being placed in the
silo. Elevators also sort deliveries by variety and quality,
such as protein level. Different quality, variety, or classes
of crop are either segregated at the silo or bin level
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Grain and Oilseeds
Virtually all grains and oilseeds produced in the United States are traceable from produc-
tion to consumption. For the most part, however, quality and safety variation in grain and
oilseeds has not warranted the cost of precise traceability systems. Systems to track prod-
uct to elevators, the point at which quality and safety are monitored, have been largely
sufficient for the efficient operation of grain and oilseed markets. Growing demand for
specialty crops, including products not genetically engineered, has spurred the develop-
ment of more precise traceability systems, although the elevator still operates as an
important quality-control point.depending on the size of the elevator and anticipated vol-
umes of production. Elevators then blend shipments to
achieve a homogeneous quality. Once blended, only the
new grading information is relevant—there is no need to
track back to the farm to control for quality problems.
Strict segregation by farm would thwart the ability of
elevators to mix shipments for homogeneous product and
would not be necessary for safety or quality assurance.
Country elevators strive to market crops of homogeneous
quality to millers, feed manufacturers, and oilseed crush-
ing facilities. Millers and crushers, in turn, sell processed
grains (such as corn grits), flours, and oil to food proces-
sors. Crushers also sell soybean meal to feed manufactur-
ers. Country elevators send grain and oilseeds to inland
sub-terminal and/or river elevators, which collect crops
from different regions. River elevators then ship crops to
port elevators that load grain and oilseeds onto vessels
for export to foreign countries.
Precision in traceback to the farm declines the further
one goes down the production chain. As grain is funneled
from a wider geographic area, it is more difficult to pin-
point from where and from whom the commodities
came. For example, grain held at port elevators may have
originated from a number of country elevators serving a
large number of farmers across a wide geographic area.
Traceability at the port elevator level typically extends
only back to the country or sub-terminal elevator.
Recordkeeping systems for conventional grains and
oilseeds can therefore be best characterized as “one step
forward, one step backward.” That is, handlers know
from whom they bought grain and to whom it was sold.
This one-step-forward, one-step-backward system means
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Figure 6
The grain marketing system
























Source:  Adapted from The Organization and Performance of the U.S. Food System by Bruce W. Marion, 1986that a given handler is acquainted only with the entities
that it deals with directly. Retrieving information from
further up or down the marketing chain forces the han-
dler to rely on the recordkeeping ability of others in the
chain. For example, if a river elevator needed informa-
tion on the farmers who produced the soybeans stored in
its silo, the river elevator would need to look up in its
own files the identity of the local elevators that supplied
the soybeans. Each local elevator would have to check its
accounting information on which farmers had made
deliveries. Thus, traceability to the farm, or handful of
farms, in conventional grain marketing is possible only
with the collection of records from each handler along
the supply chain.
Grain or oilseed handlers that are vertically integrated
have access to more information. That is, such firms
operate at more than one stage in the grain marketing
chain. For example, a large grain company may own
local elevators as well as river and export port elevators.
The depth of information is greater for vertically inte-
grated firms simply because records from different
stages are maintained in-house. Vertically integrated
firms can more easily retrieve information from their
operating units.
Whether vertically integrated or not, elevators serve an
important role as a quality-control point in the grain sup-
ply chain and as the linchpin in the traceability system.
They monitor and control product quality and safety and
keep records on the flow of product from farms to the
elevator. Since the bulk system fulfills buyers’ demands
with cleaning and blending, there is no need for informa-
tion to be collected throughout the supply chain: infor-
mation from the next immediate step in the supply chain
is sufficient.
Specialty Crops 
While most grains and oilseeds in the United States are
produced and marketed in bulk, there are growing mar-
kets for more specialized commodities. Some examples
include high-value crops (e.g., high-oil corn), organic
foods, and non-genetically engineered crops (Dimitri and
Richman; 2000; Lin, Chambers, and Harwood, 2000).
Traceability systems are becoming more extensive in
these markets, reflecting customers’ demands to verify
the presence of the specialty attribute, particularly when
it is a credence attribute. These traceability systems doc-
ument the efforts of each segment in the supply chain to
segregate the high-value specialty product from conven-
tional or other specialty products.
Segregation and traceability documentation for specialty
attributes may begin as early as the seed. At this point,
documentation verifies the existence of specific crop
traits and purity levels. In general, seed is tested and lots
are tracked using identification numbers. If necessary,
specific information about parent genes is obtained from
the seed developers.
At the farm level, farmers must segregate crops to ensure
that cross-pollination does not result in a crop that does
not meet required specifications. For example, producers
of non-genetically engineered crops, particularly corn,
may be required to keep genetically engineered varieties
away from other fields by a minimum distance to prevent
cross-pollination. In addition, farmers must either dedi-
cate certain storage, harvesting, and other equipment to
each specialty crop or thoroughly clean equipment and
storage units between different crop types. Some farmers
specialize in particular specialty crops thereby avoiding
commingling problems.
To verify that adequate precautions have been taken at
the farm level to assure the quality of the specialty grain,
farmers may be asked to provide elevators with third-
party certification. For example, for organic crops, third-
party certifiers accredited by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture work with individual farmers to determine
the requirements for organic production for each crop
and then verify that these requirements have been ful-
filled. Farmers provide this certification to buyers.
For some crops, farmers may be asked to submit their
shipments for testing. For example, the oil content of
corn and the protein level in wheat are routinely tested.
Tests may be performed by the elevator or by independ-
ent third-party verifiers. Elevators usually keep records
of test results, including the identity of the farms that
sold the commodities to them. For some specialty crops,
buyers may simply require farmers to “certify” that the
crops are as specified. This was the case early in the
development of differentiated markets for non-genetically
engineered crops.
As the repository of documentation certifying attributes
or the point of attribute testing, elevators play an impor-
tant quality-control function in the specialty crop supply
chain. In many cases, testing results and certifications
are not sent further up the supply chain because eleva-
tors essentially certify the quality and homogeneity of
their products. As with the conventional supply chain,
elevators blend shipments to achieve a homogeneous
quality and meet sanitation and quality standards. Once
blended, only the new attribute information is relevant;
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quality problems.
At the elevator level, segregation of specialty crops is
achieved with dedicated elevators (those specializing in
one type of specialty crop, such as organic, waxy corn,
non-genetically engineered crops, and food-grade soy-
beans), multiple bins, or by thoroughly cleaning bins and
equipment after each crop has passed through. If identity
preservation is required, shipments may be containerized
in order to minimize handling and the number of points
at which quality could be compromised.
A key constraint in the ability of the bulk-system infra-
structure to supply specialty grains is the ability of eleva-
tors to adjust their product flow in response to consumer
demand. Large grain companies with a large infrastruc-
ture at their disposal, including country and export eleva-
tors as well as railcars and barges, may have more flexi-
bility in managing flows and creating segregated sys-
tems. Likewise, smaller producers with access to a num-
ber of small elevators may be able to efficiently manage
specialty flows. However, as the number of specialty
attributes grows, investments in elevator infrastructure
may be required, raising the costs of segregation.
Segregation and documentation for specialty crops con-
tinue from the elevator to the final producer or consumer.
Trucks, railcars, and barges must all be thoroughly
cleaned between specialty crops or be dedicated to a par-
ticular specialty crop, as must sub-terminal, river, and
export port elevators. All along the line, either testing or
process certification guarantees that quality attributes are
maintained. As with conventional crops, such verification
is usually of the “one-step-forward, one-step-back” vari-
ety. Each player in the specialty chain is usually required
to retain information on product identity, volume, lot
numbers, test results, and suppliers/customers to ensure
quality and allow for traceback if problems arise in the
marketing chain. How far back a given elevator can trace
a shipment depends on the extent to which the firm is
vertically integrated. As with conventional grain produc-
tion, vertical integration in handling—whereby a firm
owns operations in more than one level of the marketing
chain (e.g., country and export elevators)—eases trace-
back, since information can be retrieved from internal
suppliers and/or buyers. If elevators are not vertically
integrated, they must rely on other handlers to retain
much of the information.
A number of third-party certifiers offer services to verify
that specialty quality attributes have been adequately
safeguarded throughout the supply chain. In the case of
organic products, farmers, handlers, processors, and
retailers are certified by third-party firms that must be
accredited by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Wholesalers and retailers must prove that the organic
product came from certified sources satisfying the organ-
ic labeling and handling requirements. As a result, organ-
ic products can be traced throughout the supply chain.
Generally, the cost of establishing and verifying supply
chains for specialty grains makes them more expensive
to produce than conventional grains. As a result, farmers,
elevators, and handlers may be reluctant to construct
these chains and produce these grains without some
guarantee that they will receive adequate compensation.
A large segment of the specialty crop market is therefore
built on contracts. Contracts not only allow buyers to
specify the attributes they desire, they also provide sell-
ers with assurances that their costs will be covered
through price premiums or long-term sales. Premiums
must cover the additional physical costs associated with
segregation and traceability, and also customer service
and coordination activities.
Elevators typically contract with producers to grow cer-
tain varieties, such as high-oil corn or food-grade soy-
beans, with the delivery volumes and times being prede-
termined. The contracts may specify that producers fol-
low certain production and handling practices that are
consistent with the traced products. Contracts are also
drawn up between the elevator and the buyer. Contracts
provide a type of paper trail by which commodities can
be traced.
Manufacturers may require information on a host of
characteristics, such as color, variety, grind, etc. For
example, a cereal manufacturer that uses a specific class
and grade of wheat to produce the desired flake curl
may require special coding. Larger food processors may
also require that suppliers use codes that signify that the
ingredients are specifically for the food manufacturer.
All these steps are taken to ensure high and consistent
quality over time—and to facilitate efficient ingredient
management. For efficient output management, firms
may also track final products. This information allows
companies to understand which products are popular
and where they are selling well. This information helps
companies produce the right mix of products and the
best distribution.
In general, traceability systems for specialty crops are
more precise than for conventional ones. The paperwork
generated with contracting and the existence of relatively
few producers and handlers who deal with specialty
crops make it easier to track shipments; a railcar filled
with a certain commodity can be traced back to a small
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one could not likely associate an individual kernel or
bean with a particular producer, since even specialty
crops are commingled by elevators. There are a few
cases for which one can trace shipments back to individ-
ual farmers. For example, food-grade soybeans are con-
tainerized on-farm and shipped directly to Japan.
Conclusion
Regardless of whether they involve specialty or conven-
tional grains, vertically integrated firms or independent
operators, most traceability systems for grains do not
extend back beyond the country elevator. For most man-
ufacturers and consumers, this depth of traceback is suf-
ficient to ensure quality and safety, even for specialty
quality attributes. As long as elevators continue to
ensure the safety and quality of the shipments they
receive from farmers, manufacturers will likely not
demand farm-level traceability.
If elevators fail to monitor the safety of the system, man-
ufacturers and consumers may demand better control and
maybe even farm-level traceability. The StarLink incident
in 2000 highlights the economic consequences of inade-
quate quality control at the farm and elevator level.
StarLink is a genetically engineered corn variety that was
approved for animal feed and industrial uses but not for
human consumption (Lin, Price, and Allen, 2003). In
2000, a portion of the StarLink crop was commingled
with other corn varieties, contaminating millions of
bushels stored on farms and in elevators. Moreover, as a
precaution, food manufacturers took hundreds of food
products off the market along with nearly 100 products
served at restaurants. Disruptions occurred in domestic
marketing and exports to foreign countries in the initial
stage of the incident as commingled corn was rerouted to
approved uses and contaminated food was removed from
shelves. Had StarLink been properly segregated at the
elevator, this incident would probably have been at most
a minor issue.
In the wake of the StarLink incident, many consumer
groups called for complete traceability for StarLink and
other genetically engineered crops. Better quality control
at elevators may actually be a more cost-effective means
of ensuring the quality of the Nation’s grain and oilseed
supply. However, with the growth in the variety and type
of credence quality characteristics, the ability of elevators
to continue to serve as the system’s quality-control moni-
tors hinges on advances in testing technologies and
improvements in verification services.
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bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly
known as mad cow disease) and the country-of-origin
labeling provisions included in the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill,
have focused attention on traceability in the cattle/beef
sector. Policymakers, producers, and consumers are
reassessing the value of systems to track animals and
meat from the farm to the consumer. These events, how-
ever, are not the first to motivate livestock owners and
meat processors and retailers to establish traceability sys-
tems for livestock and meat. Ownership disputes, animal
health concerns, and meat foodborne illness outbreaks
have all motivated the development of systems to identi-
fy the ownership and health status of animals and the
safety attributes of meat and meat products. 
The result of these historical motivations has been to cre-
ate two largely distinct sets of traceability systems in the
livestock/meat sector: one set for live animals and anoth-
er for meat. The current challenge for the cattle/beef sec-
tor is to link these systems and develop a system for
identifying farm-level attributes in finished meat prod-
ucts—in other words, to trace meat back to the farm. 
Traceability for Live Animals
Livestock owners have three primary motives for estab-
lishing traceability systems for live animals. First and
foremost, owners want to protect their property from
theft or loss by clearly identifying which animals belong
to them. Whenever animals are commingled, as is com-
mon in the open ranges of the United States, owners may
be motivated to use identifying marks to distinguish their
cattle from those belonging to others. 
A second primary motive driving livestock owners to
establish traceability systems for live animals is to con-
trol the spread of animal diseases. Efficient control or
eradication of disease depends on the ability of owners to
identify and track healthy and unhealthy animals. This
information is vital in calculating contagion and in
designing effective vaccination, segregation, and indem-
nity programs. 
A third motive for establishing traceability systems for
cattle lies in the fact that many valuable animal attributes
are not evident to the naked eye—or even to specialized
testing equipment. Credence attributes such as up-to-date
vaccinations, proper medical care, animal welfare provi-
sions, or feeding regimens may increase the value of an
animal. Farmers who can prove, through traceability doc-
umentation, that their animals possess such valuable
attributes are more likely to be able to negotiate higher
prices for their animals. 
These three motives have influenced the development of
traceability systems in the livestock sector in the United
States. Livestock owners have established animal trace-
ability systems to meet one or many of these objec-
tives—and have expanded or contracted systems to
reflect dynamics in animal management, disease out-
breaks, and consumer preferences for credence attributes. 
Traceability at the Cow-Calf and Stocker Level
Most of the beef that Americans consume originates
from cattle born and raised on one of the country’s
800,000 cow-calf farms (fig. 7), with lesser amounts
coming from U.S. dairies (culled dairy cows) and from
Mexico and Canada. While the American West is tradi-
tionally recognized as “cattle country,” the majority of
the beef cattle in this country are in fact raised in the
center of the country between the Mississippi River and
the 100th meridian. And, contrary to general perceptions,
the majority of cows are raised by small and mid-sized
operators. In 2002, the 5,390 large cow-calf operations,
those with more than 500 head, accounted for only 14
percent of the beef cows in this country. The 630,000
smallest operations, those with fewer than 50 head,
accounted for 29 percent of cows. In 2002, the average
herd of beef cows in the United States totaled only about
41 animals (USDA/NASS, 2003). 
Cow-calf operations require large amounts of pasture and
range land to feed the cows and growing calves. The
cows and calves may graze on land owned or leased by
the cow-calf operator or, for a fee, on Federal lands.
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Cattle and Beef 
The cattle/beef sector has a long history of identifying and tracking animals to establish
rights of ownership and to control the spread of animal diseases. Producers in the meat
sector have also developed traceability systems to improve product flow and to limit qual-
ity and safety failures. Recent developments are motivating firms to bridge animal and
meat traceability systems and establish systems for tracking meat from the farm to the
retailer. Though technological innovations are helping to reduce the costs of such sys-
tems, institutional and philosophical barriers are slowing their adoption. Grazing lands may be adjacent and not separated by
fencing, meaning that animals belonging to different peo-
ple may get mixed. Many farmers find it worthwhile to
brand or otherwise identify their cattle to avoid owner-
ship disputes. 
The traditional method of identification for cattle is
branding, whether hot branding, freeze branding, hide
branding, or horn branding. As early as the Roman
Empire, competitors employed branding irons to burn
their names onto horses used in chariot races (Blancou,
2002). In the 7th century, the Chinese used branding irons
to identify horses used by the postal service. Branding is
also the traditional method of animal identification used
in the United States. Most Western States still have brand-
ing laws that require brands to be registered and to be
inspected when animals are moved or sold. 
Other methods of animal identification include tattooing,
retina scanning (Optibranding™), iris imaging, and, cur-
rently the most common method, tagging. Tags may have
simple printed numbers, imbedded microchips, or
machine-readable codes, such as radio frequency identifi-
cation (RFID). Ear tags cost in the neighborhood of $1 or
$2 apiece. RFID technology is more costly, with instru-
ments for reading RFID tags costing several hundred dol-
lars apiece, though prices have been rapidly falling.
Increasingly, tags include more information than just ani-
mal ownership. Coded information on tags may provide
information on vaccination records, health history, breed-
ing characteristics, and other process attributes. This
information is either encoded directly on the tag or kept
in separate records that are linked to the animal via codes
on the tag. Larger cow-calf operations are much more
likely to use individual or group calf identification sys-
tems than smaller operations because it is more difficult
to remember characteristics of individual cattle when
there are many animals. Information on individual ani-
mal characteristics is also valuable in cases where calves
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imported from Canadaare sold to other cow-calf operators—a common occur-
rence as calves are moved to operations with available
forage. New owners may demand information on vacci-
nation records and other animal characteristics. 
APHIS/USDA estimates that in 1997, 65 percent of
calves were individually identified on large cow-calf
operations (USDA/APHIS, 2000a,b). Overall estimates
suggest that about 49 percent of all cow-calf operators
use some form of individual identification with an esti-
mated 52 percent of calves and about 65 percent of beef
cows individually identified. More operations use some
form of group identification, so that about 74 percent of
cows are group identified at the cow-calf level. 
Identification systems not only facilitate transactions
between sellers and buyers, they also help safeguard the
health of the livestock sector as a whole. Animal identifi-
cation and tracking systems help ensure that unhealthy
animals are not allowed to contaminate healthy herds.
Nearly all States require a Certificate of Veterinary
Inspection (CVI) for livestock entering the State. The
CVI for interstate commerce is an official document,
issued and signed by a licensed, accredited, and depu-
tized veterinarian. The CVI provides documentation that
an animal or a group of animals was apparently healthy
and showed no signs of contagious or communicable dis-
eases on the date the inspection took place. 
Animal identification is also an important element of
Federal programs for animal disease control and eradica-
tion. For example the program targeted at eradicating bru-
cellosis, a costly and contagious disease that can affect
ruminant animals and also humans (USDA/APHIS, Dec.
2003), hinges on “Market Cattle Identification (MCI).”
With MCI, numbered tags called backtags are placed on
the shoulders of marketed breeding animals from beef,
dairy, and bison herds. MCI, along with testing proce-
dures, provides a means of determining the brucellosis
status of animals marketed from a large area and elimi-
nates the need to round up cattle in all herds for routine
testing. In the case of test-positive animals, ownership can
be more easily identified and herds that may be affected
can be efficiently isolated and tested. For cattle and bison
in heavily infected areas or replacement animals added to
such herds, officials recommend vaccination. At the time
of vaccination, a tattoo is applied in the ear; identifying
the animal as an “official vaccinate.” The tattoo identifies
the year in which vaccination took place.
The brucellosis eradication program has had dramatic
results. In 1956, testing identified 124,000 affected herds
in the United States. By 1992, this number had dropped
to 700 herds, and as of June 30, 2000, there were only 6
known affected herds remaining in the entire United
States (USDA/APHIS, Dec. 2003). 
The success of the Federal animal-disease eradication
programs has not only dramatically reduced the number
of diseased livestock but also reduced the motivation for
animal identification for these diseases. These programs
demonstrate the ability of the industry to establish trace-
ability systems for disease control—and the ability of the
industry to jettison such systems when the benefits no
longer outweigh the costs. 
Traceability at the Feedlot
At 6 to 18 months old and weighing 500 to 900 pounds,
calves are moved to a cattle feeding operation. Cattle
feeding operations, or feedlots, are enterprises largely
unique to the United States and Canada. The extensive
production of soymeal and corn in the United States pro-
vides an inexpensive source of animal feed and an eco-
nomic rationale for feedlots. Animals are fed until they
reach slaughter weights in the 1,200-1,300 lb. range—for
most cattle this corresponds to 90 to 180 days in the
feedlot depending on their initial weight. 
Feedlots are of two major types: farmer feedlots and
commercial feedlots, with the latter gaining greatly in
dominance over the last three decades. The approximate-
ly 93,000 small farmer feedlots (under 1,000 head capac-
ity) are typically one part of a grain-farm operation and
may feed home-raised or purchased calves with home-
raised feed. The average small farmer feedlot had an
average inventory of only about 25 head in 2002 (USDA,
NASS Dec. 2003).
Most commercial feedlots are located in the Western
Cornbelt and Plains States of Texas, Kansas, Nebraska,
Colorado, and Iowa. Commercial feedlots feed both cat-
tle owned by the feedlot as well as other people’s cattle
for a fee (custom feeding). Custom-fed cattle can be
owned by a cow-calf producer (called retained owner-
ship) or by outside investors. Because of mixed owner-
ship, identification of cattle on large commercial feedlots
is more important than on farmer-owned feedlots, and
consequently there is likely to be more branding or ear-
tagging on commercial operations. Branding or ear-tag-
ging also helps feedlot operators to more easily sort ani-
mals by vaccination records and breeding and other char-
acteristics. Table 3 shows that over 98 percent of cattle
on large commercial feedlots (8,000 head of cattle or
more) have individual or group identifiers (large com-
mercial lots account for 66 percent of cattle) while
almost 80 percent of cattle on small commercial feedlots
have such identifiers (USDA, APHIS, 2000). 
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Cattle ready for slaughter are trucked to slaughter plants.
Most fed cattle are sold in direct transactions between
the cattle owner (or agent) and the packing company. A
typical transaction for cattle sold on a liveweight basis
involves the feedlot’s placing cattle on a “showlist” and
packer-buyers’ viewing and placing bids on cattle with a
final spot price arrived at by negotiation. Many other cat-
tle are sold on a carcass basis (payment delayed until
animal is slaughtered and carcass weighed), increasingly
under a contract or agreement specifying the source for a
base published price and an agreed-upon schedule or
“grid” of premiums and discounts based on actual car-
cass characteristics. Of course, in these cases, the carcass
basis can be determined only after the packer slaughters
the animal. The base price and adjustments produce the
final “formula” price adjusted for quality. 
When valuable animal characteristics are unobservable at
the point of sale, traceability records linking a particular
animal to records on health and other characteristics help
establish the premium grid and facilitate efficient market
transactions. At sale from feedlot to slaughter plant—and
at every point of sale in the chain—traceability documen-
tation enables producers to sell their cattle at a price that
more accurately reflects quality. Traceability documenta-
tion is the only way to verify the existence of credence
attributes such as animal “playtime” and non-genetically
engineered feed. 
Though traceability documentation is a valuable tool for
farmers who wish to appropriate the benefits of invest-
ments in animal health or quality, it may also entail some
unwelcome side effects. Traceability documentation may
force farmers to “appropriate” the costs of failures in ani-
mal health or quality. The possibility that traceability
could be used to place liability for unhealthy or low-
quality animals on farmers makes many in the livestock
sector uncomfortable. Many producers adhere to an ethic
that a seller should not knowingly sell diseased or defec-
tive feeder or breeder livestock without disclosing such
to the buyer, but that after an honest sale, if any problems
arise with the animals’ health or fitness, including death,
the seller is not liable. The buyer assumes all risks asso-
ciated with long-term animal health. 
Livestock producers have accordingly long enjoyed some
legal protection from liability for factors over which they
have little or no control after the sale. Livestock has tra-
ditionally been exempt from commercial implied-warran-
ty laws partly because farmers were considered not to be
“merchants.” As farms became more commercialized,
and buyers more litigious, this protection has become
less secure; in response many States passed specific
exemptions for livestock. Some version of the statutory
exclusion of implied warranties has now been adopted in
almost half of the States, in particular those States where
the livestock industry is of major economic importance.
The Kansas statute is typical of the modification
(McEowen, 1996, p. 7):
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-2-316(3)(d):
[W]ith respect to the sale of livestock, other
than the sale of livestock for immediate slaugh-
ter, there shall be no implied warranties, except
that the provisions of this paragraph shall not
apply in any case where the seller knowingly
sells livestock which is diseased. 
Traceability at Slaughter
There are over 3,000 small and large firms slaughtering
cattle in the United States. Most cattle slaughtered are
fed steers and heifers, typically slaughtered by one of the
four large major packers located in the feeding States
that dominate the industry and account for about 82 per-
cent of steer and heifer slaughter and 69 percent of all
cattle. Culled cow and bull slaughter tends to occur in
smaller firms, less concentrated geographically and less
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Table 3—Percent of cattle identified in commercial feedlots, by size of operation1
Small feedlots Large feedlots
Percent of cattle
Tagged with a unique number such that each animal was individually identifiable 
(excluding tagging of sick animals) 29.6 31.1
Individually identified using a method other than tagging such that each animal was 
individually identifiable (excluding tagging of sick animals) 1.6 2.1
Identified with a group or owner identifier (pen tag, brand, hot tag, ear notch, etc.) 49.7 80.0
Not identified 21.9 1.6
1Small operations 1,000-7,999 head, large operations, 8,000 head or more.
Source: USDA, APHIS, 2000.likely to be vertically integrated (USDA/GIPSA, 2001).
In addition to domestic cattle, U.S. plants slaughter
imported cattle, mainly from Canada,2 although calves
are also imported from Mexico and fed on pasture and in
feedlots to slaughter weights. 
FSIS (Food Safety and Inspection Service) regulations
require that slaughter plants keep the head and certain
organs of slaughtered animals, plus all identifying tags,
until all parts of the animal pass inspection. Slaughter
plants must be able to identify which head and organs
belong with which carcass. In most plants this is done by
keeping them physically synchronized on separate chain
and conveyors. The identity of individual animals is fre-
quently lost once inspection takes place. At this point,
the health and safety of the animal has been “verified”
and the focus shifts to the safety of the meat. 
Traceability for Meat
Two primary motives have driven the development of
traceability systems for meat and meat products: supply
management and safety and quality control. Traceability
systems enable slaughter plants and processors to more
efficiently track the flow of product and coordinate pro-
duction. Traceability systems also help plants minimize
the extent of safety or quality failures, thereby minimiz-
ing damages. 
A number of large foodborne illness outbreaks and
heightened awareness of food safety issues have led
many producers to adopt increasingly precise traceability
systems. These systems reflect not just the fact that the
benefits of traceability are rising, but also the fact that
technological innovations are reducing the costs of trace-
ability. These trends are expected to continue as retailers
and importers demand safer food and as the science and
technology of pathogen control improves, thereby
spurring additional demand for traceability and addition-
al incentives for innovation. 
Meat Tracking from Slaughter/Processor to Retailer
Most large firms convert beef carcasses into primal and
subprimal cuts or “boxed beef.” Ground beef is
processed from mixes of boneless beef imported primari-
ly from Australia and New Zealand and trimmings from
domestic animals to attain a desired fat content. Boxed
beef and ground beef are shipped to retailers, food serv-
ice firms, and exporters, sometimes through specialty
processors, institutional processor/distributors, and meat
wholesalers. Increasingly, most large firms also further
cut and package “case-ready” retail cuts ready to drop
into the display case in the grocery store. 
Slaughter plants and processors have developed a num-
ber of sophisticated systems for tracking the flow of pro-
duction and monitoring quality and safety. In accordance
with ISO 9000 guidelines, most track inputs by batch or
lot and then assign new batch or lot numbers to track
product as it is transformed. To control foodborne
pathogens such as E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella,a
number of processors have established very precise sam-
pling, testing, and tracking protocols. 
For example, one of the largest independent ground beef
producers in the United States begins its traceability doc-
umentation with the trimmings entering the plant.
Incoming combo bins (2,000 lbs.) of raw material are
sampled at least every 100,000 pounds, which for most
raw material suppliers is daily. All raw materials are rou-
tinely screened for Aerobic Plate Counts (APC), generic
coliforms, generic E. coli, Staphylococcus aureus,
Salmonella, and Listeria monocytogenes. If lots test
higher than standards, the supplier is notified immediate-
ly and testing is intensified. Samples are next taken at the
final grind head, where each batch of 3,000 pounds of
ground beef is tested for E. coli O157:H7. Finally, sam-
ples of the finished product are taken from each process
line every 15 minutes. Every hour, composites of the four
samples are tested to detect E. coli O157:H7. These sam-
ples are also combined to make a “half-shift” composite,
which is tested for an entire microbial profile. If the half-
shift composites show spikes or high counts, more tests
are run on the backup samples also collected every 15
minutes (Golan et al., 2004). 
As a result of its testing protocol, traceability documenta-
tion is extensive for this producer. This documentation
enables the producer to monitor the quality and safety of
its inputs and to work with suppliers to improve the qual-
ity of inputs, or drop suppliers that cannot comply. The
producer’s documentation also serves to provide buyers
with assurances about the quality and safety of the pro-
ducer’s products. As a result, this producer has been able
to shift from being a commodity producer selling on a
week-to-week basis to being a contract supplier to major
hamburger restaurants. This shift has allowed this pro-
ducer to improve its operational efficiency through better
planning for capacity utilization, capital investment,
spending plans, and other business activities.
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2 Or they did until the ban on importation of animals from Canada
due to the discovery of mad cow disease in a single cow in western
Canada, May 2003. The United States and Canada are negotiating to
begin bringing cattle under 30 months of age into the United States
for immediate slaughter, or to designated feedlots for slaughter at less
than 30 months of age (www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/10/
0372.htm).Though not every processor or slaughter plant maintains
records as precise as in the above example, virtually all
meat sold in the United States is traceable from retail
back to the processor or slaughter plant. Regulations
require that USDA inspection numbers for the processing
plant remain on the labels of meat as they pass through
the distribution systems along with other information,
depending on ingredients in the meat product and mar-
keting chain. Other firm and lot number information can
be placed on labels to identify a particular processing
batch from a package of meat. Most, if not all, voluntary
recalls listed on USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service website, refer consumers to coded information
on products’ packaging specifying the lot or batch of
items included in the recall. Good product tracing sys-
tems help minimize the production and distribution of
unsafe or poor-quality products, thereby minimizing the
potential for bad publicity, liability, and recalls.
Linking Animal and Meat Traceability Systems
Traditionally, once carcasses have passed USDA inspec-
tion, slaughter plants have not maintained information
on the identity or characteristics of each animal. Until
very recently, there have not been market or human-
health reasons to do so. Now, however, meat-quality
pricing has begun to expand beyond characteristics that
can be judged by examining the meat itself. Meat prices
have begun to reflect credence attributes related to farm-
level, live-animal characteristics, such as animal welfare,
type of feed, and use of antibiotics and growth hor-
mones. In addition, diseases such as mad cow have
established a link between animal health and human
health—and have motivated many consumers, including
those represented by foreign governments, to demand
traceability back to the farm and animal feeding records
(see box, “Animal Identification”). 
In response to these new motivations, the livestock sec-
tor has begun to build traceability systems to bridge ani-
mal tracking systems with those for meat tracking.
Several systems can and have been incorporated into
slaughtering lines to link group or individual animals
with their meat products. These include sequence-in-
slaughter order, carcass tagging, trolley-tracking, and
RFID devices. Some systems are capital intensive and
favor larger firms that can capture economies of scale,
while others are labor intensive and may actually confer
an advantage to smaller operations. For example, carcass
tagging may require a human to apply the tag(s) while
trolleys can be tracked optically and electronically.
Small low-speed operations may have an advantage in
maintaining animal identification because they can more
likely use physical separation and tagging. Regardless of
which technology is cost effective, the success of the
system depends on appropriate operating procedures and
traceability recordkeeping to keep sequences and identi-
fication numbers synchronized. 
Scientific advances in animal identification will continue
to reduce the cost and increase diffusion of animal-to-
meat traceability. A variety of high-tech, rapid animal
identification methods such as electronic implants, band-
ing, or tagging have been developed and science is
advancing to a point where DNA testing could be used to
help identify and trace animal products. Unlike electronic
tags and animal “passports,” biological signatures would
be virtually impossible to falsify and could follow the
product after processing. 
Though technological barriers to animal-meat traceabili-
ty are rapidly dissolving, philosophical and in some
cases, legal barriers remain or are being erected. As pre-
viously mentioned, livestock has traditionally been
exempt from commercial implied-warranty laws. Many
in the livestock sector worry that traceability systems
linking meat to animals will break this tradition and
shift at least some of the liability for foodborne illness
back to cow-calf operators and feedlots. Some livestock
organizations have even publicly called for limits on lia-
bility that may arise from animal identification. For
example, the Kansas Livestock Association (2003), a
nonprofit trade association representing nearly 6,000
livestock producers, has recommended:
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Animal Identification
A national animal identification plan is being developed
through a cooperative effort of USDA, State animal
health officials, and livestock industry groups (see:
http://www.usaip.info#.). Called the National Identifica-
tion Development Team, its goal is to develop a nation-
al standardized program that can identify all premises
and animals that had direct contact with a foreign ani-
mal disease within 48 hours of discovery. The plan is
aimed at quickly identifying animals exposed to disease
and the history of their movements in order to rapidly
detect, contain, and eliminate disease threats (Wiemers,
2003). The first phase of the work requires establishing
standardized premise identification numbers for all pro-
duction operations, markets, assembly points, exhibi-
tions and processing plants. The second phase calls for
individual identification for cattle in commerce. Other
food animal and livestock species in commerce would
be required to be identified through individual or
group/lot identification.WHEREAS, livestock producers and govern-
ment officials are researching the feasibility of
a national individual animal identification
program, and
WHEREAS, such a program, on a voluntary
or mandatory basis, could provide the live-
stock industry a tool to quickly trace animal
disease sources and enhance a breeder’s abili-
ty to identify genetics that meet consumer
demands, and
WHEREAS, animal trace-back technology
can increase the liability exposure for owners
of animals whose food and by-products threat-
en or cause damages to consumers, and
WHEREAS, liability in these circumstances
can often be classified as “strict liability,”
even though an animal owner may not be at
fault for such damages.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, the
Kansas Livestock Association supports state
and federal legislation to limit animal owners’
liability exposure that may arise under a pri-
vate or public animal identification program.
In part to overcome some of the gaps in tracing docu-
mentation and quality assurance that may arise in the
system, a small but growing segment of the cattle/beef
industry has entered into alliances, associations, coopera-
tives, or marketing groups in which groups of cattle rais-
ers, cattle feeders, producers, slaughter plants, and
processors share some combination of decisions, respon-
sibilities, information, costs, and returns. In many cases,
alliances set quality and/or safety standards and provide
systems to verify that quality standards for credence
attributes exist. These types of alliances or vertically
integrated operations such as those found in the pork (see
box, “Traceability in Hogs and Pork”) and poultry sec-
tors, use contracts and incentives to link stages of pro-
duction. Links are created between entities under sepa-
rate ownership to help coordinate the efforts of those
entities. Alliances attempt to create a market identity
with a goal of producing a product that consumers desire
and for which they are willing to pay a premium and
sharing that premium with upstream entities (Florida
Cooperative Extension Service, 2002). 
Many of the products marketed through alliances entail
credence attributes that the alliance certifies to exist. In
some cases, alliances or even individual producers
choose to use third-party certifiers to help establish credi-
ble claims. One such certifier is USDA’s Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS). AMS’s service is a voluntary
fee-based program that certifies claims on items such as
breed, feeding practices, or other process claims. The
AMS “USDA Process Verified” label provides buyers
with assurances that the advertised credence attributes
actually exist (USDA, AMS 2004). 
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Traceability in Hogs and Pork 
There are traditionally three basic types of hog enterpris-
es. The first is feeder-pig production in which the farmer
specializes in farrowing operations that produce 10- to
40-pound pigs. Feeder pig producers sell or transfer pigs
to others for finishing. At farrow-to-finish operations, all
phases of slaughter hog production are carried out by the
same operation, though not necessarily in the same phys-
ical location. Third is feeder-pig finishing, in which feed-
er pigs are obtained from others and fed to slaughter
weights. In the last decade, hog production has become
even more specialized with separate nursery and growing
phases appearing between farrowing and finishing.
Increasingly, hogs are raised on a batch basis—“all in all
out” which facilitates cleaning facilities between batches.
In 1950, over 2 million U.S. farmers sold hogs and pigs
with average sales of 31 head per farm per year. By 2002,
the number of farms had fallen to around 75,000 opera-
tions. More than half of these operations had fewer than
100 head, but this small-size group had only 1 percent of
the hogs. In contrast, the 2,300 operations with more
than 5,000 head accounted for more than half of the hogs
in 2002 (USDA, NASS, Dec. 2003). Much larger mega-
farms have been evolving into more important players;
the 200 or so mega-farms are highly integrated. Some
have more than 30,000 sows under tightly contracted or
integrated arrangements from breeding to slaughter or
even retail. Identification by herd or batch is therefore
much higher today than 50 years ago.
Many hog operations, both large and small, not just
mega-farms, are integrated by ownership or contractually
connected to slaughtering firms. Less than 20 percent of
slaughter hogs were sold in the spot market in 2002.
Another large group of slaughter hogs are sold on a for-
mula basis, sometimes under a continuing agreement.
Hogs produced by or under contract for slaughter firms
require no market transaction between the finisher and
the slaughtering firm. Thus, the road from hogs to pork is
far more integrated than in the cattle/beef sector—as are
traceability systems. Conclusions
The livestock industry has successfully developed and
maintained a host of traceability systems: some for live
animals and some for meat. Ranchers, cow-calf opera-
tors, and feedlot operators have had at least three
motives in developing live-animal traceability: to estab-
lish ownership; to control animal diseases and quality;
and to facilitate quality-based pricing. Livestock owners
have established animal traceability systems to meet one
or more of these objectives—and have expanded or con-
tracted systems to reflect dynamics in animal manage-
ment, disease outbreaks, and consumer preferences for
credence attributes.
Slaughter plants and processors have had two primary
motives for establishing traceability for meat products: to
manage their supply chains and assure quality control
and food safety. Traceability systems enable slaughter
plants and processors to more efficiently track the flow
of product and to coordinate production. Traceability sys-
tems also help plants minimize the extent of safety or
quality failures, thereby minimizing damages. A number
of large foodborne illness outbreaks and heightened
awareness of food safety issues have led many producers
to adopt increasingly precise meat traceability systems—
a trend that is expected to continue with ever-increasing
demands for food safety. 
The challenge facing the industry now is to coordinate
and link many disparate animal and meat traceability
systems and priorities and develop a standardized sys-
tem for identifying farm-level, live-animal attributes in
finished meat products. Two institutional barriers may
hinder these efforts. First, because USDA determines
and certifies an animal’s health and its suitability for the
human food chain, meat processors may not have as
much of an incentive to retain information on the origin
of each piece of meat as they would if they were solely
responsible for ensuring animal health. 
Second, livestock has traditionally been exempt from
commercial implied-warranty laws and many institution-
al or legal barriers are being constructed to safeguard this
tradition. Limiting the liability of the cow-calf operator
or feedlot will dampen incentives to establish traceability
from meat to animal. Traceability to the animal supplier
is less valuable if the supplier cannot be held legally
accountable for diseased animals. 
In part to overcome some of the gaps in tracing docu-
mentation and quality assurance that may arise in the
system because of limits to liability, a small but growing
segment of the cattle/beef industry has turned to
alliances, associations, cooperatives, or marketing groups
to help establish and enforce quality and safety standards
and facilitate linking animal-tracking systems and trace-
ability of meat products. The U.S. Animal Identification
Plan is another major effort in this direction.
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ability systems across sectors of the food industry
because the costs and benefits of traceability vary sys-
tematically. Each sector has confronted different motiva-
tions for and constraints to erecting traceability systems.
Different food safety problems, supply management
concerns, and demands for credence attributes have
motivated different sectors of the food industry to build
traceability systems that vary in breadth, depth, and pre-
cision. Differences in product characteristics and infra-
structure have led to differences in traceability costs that
have also influenced the breadth, depth, and precision of
the different systems. 
Variation in traceability systems tends to reflect an effi-
cient balancing of private costs and benefits. Are there,
however, cases where variation actually signals market
failure? Does the private sector supply of traceability fail
to satisfy important social objectives? 
The economic literature on market failure suggests that
insufficient traceability in food markets could arise as a
result of asymmetric or missing information problems in
markets for food or as a result of externality or public
good aspects of traceability. We find that though these
possibilities arise, they do not typify the three food sec-
tors we investigated. In all three food sectors, the private
sector has developed methods to address costly market
failure problems. We do find, however, that public good
aspects of traceability may result in a less than optimal
supply of traceability for identifying contaminated food
once it is has been bought and consumed. In the sections
below, we examine areas of potential market failure and
industry and government response. 
Market Failure and Differentiated Markets 
for Quality and Safety 
Though firms have an incentive to use traceability sys-
tems to help generate information on credence attributes
of value, they do not have an incentive to generate infor-
mation about credence attributes that are not of value or
have a negative value. As a result, the market may pro-
duce too little information about negative attributes. This
potential is mitigated through the process of competitive
disclosure. For example, though a food product may not
sport a “high fat” label, the fact that rival brands are
labeled “low fat” may lead consumers to conclude that
the unlabeled product is in fact high in fat. This competi-
tive disclosure, which Ippolito and Mathios (1990) named
the “unfolding” theory, results in explicit claims for all
positive aspects of products and allows consumers to
make appropriate inferences about foods without claims. 
However, competitive unfolding tends not to work when
an entire product category has an undesirable characteris-
tic that cannot be changed appreciably or for which the
costs of alteration are too high, or where disclosure of
the attribute may have negative repercussions. One area
where product differentiation may be lacking is food
safety. Very few firms seek to differentiate their product
for consumers with respect to food safety (Golan et al.,
2004). This may reflect the fact that foodborne pathogens
are a commonly shared problem that is difficult to con-
trol with precision (Roberts et al., 2001). Firms may
want to avoid specific safety guarantees that could
expose them to additional liability because there is
always the possibility that even the most careful producer
could experience a safety problem. As a result, even the
best producers may refrain from marketing safety to final
consumers or trying to differentiate themselves from less
safe producers. 
Firms may also shy away from differentiating themselves
and their safety records through traceability or other
mechanisms if there is value in some level of anonymity
(Starbird and Amanor-Boadu, 2003). If traceability sys-
tems increase the probability that a firm will be identified
as a source of food safety problems and exposed to lia-
bility and bad publicity, then the firm may have an incen-
tive to remain anonymous even if it has a good safety
record. The benefits of product differentiation may not
outweigh the costs of being more easily linked to a food
product in the case of safety problems. In these cases, the
market solution results in less disclosure than desired by
consumers or less traceability than is socially optimal.
The amount of traceability offered by private firms for
product differentiation may also be less than socially
optimal if the benefits to the firm of establishing trace-
ability for credible product differentiation is dampened
by the existence of partial disclosure and innuendo. In
some cases, the possibility of deception may erode pro-
ducers’ incentives to establish traceability systems
because widespread deception makes consumers doubt
the veracity of claims made by all producers, even honest
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IV. Market Failure in the Supply 
of Traceability:
Industry and Government Responseones. For some honest producers, the benefits of over-
coming this high degree of consumer doubt will not out-
weigh the costs. For example, prior to the introduction of
national organic standards, the proliferation of organic
standards and labels—some more “organic” than others—
may have made it difficult and costly for true organic pro-
ducers to differentiate their product. Since credence attrib-
utes are inherently difficult to verify, they may be espe-
cially susceptible to fraud and unfair competition. 
Industry Efforts To Bolster Differentiation 
In the three food sectors we investigated, producers seem
to be responsive to consumer demand for product differ-
entiation. When consumer demand was strong enough to
cover the cost of product differentiation, producers
responded with new products and new traceability sys-
tems to substantiate credence attribute claims. While pro-
ducers have difficulties marketing safety attributes direct-
ly to consumers, producers routinely market safety at
earlier stages in the supply chain. The rich variety of dif-
ferentiated products for sale in the fresh fruit and veg-
etable, grain, and livestock and meat sectors of the food
industry—and the size and diversity of the industry—
argue against the conclusion that market failure is stifling
product differentiation in any of these markets. And,
where market failure may have begun to emerge with
respect to credence attributes, individual firms and indus-
try groups have developed systems for policing the
veracity of credence claims and for creating markets for
differentiated products. Third-party safety/quality audi-
tors are at the heart of these efforts. 
Third-party entities (neither the buyer nor the seller) pro-
vide objective validation of quality attributes and trace-
ability systems. They reassure input buyers and final con-
sumers that the product’s attributes are as advertised.
Third-party verification of credence attributes can be pro-
vided by a wide variety of entities, including consumer
groups, producer associations, private third-party entities,
and international organizations. For example, Food
Alliance and Veri-Pure, private for-profit entities, provide
independent verification of food products that are grown
in accordance with the principles of sustainable agricul-
ture. Third-party entities certify attributes as wide rang-
ing as kosher, free-range, predator-friendly, no-hormone
use, location of production, and “slow food.”
Governments can also provide voluntary third-party veri-
fication services. For example, to facilitate marketing,
producers may voluntarily abide by commodity grading
systems established and monitored by the government. 
Third-party entities also offer services to validate safety
procedures and bolster market differentiation with
respect to food safety. A growing number of buyers,
including many restaurants and some grocery stores, are
beginning to require that their suppliers establish
safety/quality traceability systems and to verify, often
through third-party certification, that such systems func-
tion as necessary. A growing number of firms are begin-
ning to try to differentiate the safety of their products and
processes for input buyers. 
Most, if not all, third-party food-safety/quality certifiers
such as the Swiss-based Société Générale de Surveillance
(SGS) and the American Institute of Baking (AIB) recog-
nize traceability as the centerpiece of a firm’s safety man-
agement system. For example, AIB’s standard food safety
audit specifies a number of traceability-specific activities
including (American Institute of Baking, 2003):
 Records were maintained for all incoming materials
indicating date of receipt, carrier, lot number, tempera-
ture, amounts, and product condition. 
 A documented, regularly reviewed, recall program was
on file for all products manufactured. All products
were coded, and lot or batch number records were
maintained. Distribution records were maintained to
identify the initial distribution and to facilitate segre-
gation and recall of specific lots. 
 All raw materials were identified in the program and
work in progress, re-work, and finished products were
traceable at all stages of manufacture, storage, dispatch
and, where appropriate, distribution to the customer. 
Third-party standards and certifying agencies are
employed across the food industry. In 2002, AIB audited
5,954 food facilities in the United States and was slated
to audit 6,697 in 2003 (Wohler, 2003); SGS expected to
perform over 1,000 U.S. food safety audits in 2003
(Guidry and Muliyil, 2003); and ISO management stan-
dards are implemented by more than 430,000 organiza-
tions in 158 countries (ISO website). Food sectors
employing third-party verifiers cover the spectrum from
spices and seasoning to fruit and vegetables to meat and
seafood to bakery products and dough. The growth of
third-party standards and certifying agencies is helping to
push the whole food industry—not just those firms that
employ third-party auditors—toward documented, verifi-
able traceability systems. 
Third-party audits provide customers, buyers, and in
some cases, governments with assurances that a firm’s
safety management systems, including its traceability
systems, have met some objective standards for quality.
These assurances have potential to translate into increased
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the firm’s products on the part of downstream and final
customers. These assurances are helping to reduce the
potential for market failure and to bolster markets for
safety and quality. 
Government Efforts To Bolster Differentiation
Government may also try to stimulate the supply of infor-
mation and product differentiation. Mandatory traceability
has been suggested as one possible policy option for sup-
plying consumers with more information about credence
attributes, including such diverse attributes as country of
origin and genetic composition. One difficulty with such
proposals is that they often fail to differentiate between
valuable quality attributes, those for which verification is
needed, and other less valuable attributes. For example, a
government policy requiring that producers of valuable
organic foods provide verification that these foods are
indeed organic could protect consumers from fraud and
producers from unfair competition. No such verification
would be necessary for conventionally produced foods.
Consumers do not need proof that conventional foods are
indeed conventional—there is no potential for fraud in
this case, no danger that producers would try to cheat
consumers by misidentifying organic as conventional. A
mandatory traceability system for both organic and con-
ventional foods is unnecessary to protect consumers from
fraud or producers from unfair competition. 
Likewise, government may have an incentive to require
that producers of foods that are not genetically engi-
neered verify that these foods are in fact not genetically
engineered, if that attribute is of value to some con-
sumers. However, no such verification would be neces-
sary for the genetically engineered foods currently on the
market, because this attribute is not of value to con-
sumers (most genetically engineered products currently
on the market have producer, not consumer attributes). A
mandatory traceability system for both genetically engi-
neered and non-genetically engineered foods is unneces-
sary to protect consumers from fraud or producers from
unfair competition. Such a system would raise costs
without generating compensating benefits. Mandatory
traceability for product differentiation that is not targeted
to specific attributes of value to consumers will be costly
and unnecessary. 
Another difficulty with mandatory traceability lies in the
propensity for government programs to require uniformi-
ty. As our industry review illustrates, private firms oper-
ate a wide variety of complex, highly sophisticated trace-
ability systems. A government-mandated system that
required all firms to adopt the same template could be
highly costly and inefficient. For example, mandatory
traceability systems requiring a common or standard lot
size could result in enormous, unnecessary costs to
industry. One meat processor found that, by working
with USDA to develop a sub-lot sampling system, it was
able to reduce the amount of product that needed to be
destroyed in cases of contamination and, as a result, sub-
stantially reduced its destruction costs. In another case, a
fruit producer found that USDA safety requirements
specifying a particular lot size led to the development of
a complicated traceability system that did not mesh with
the plant’s production/transportation system. 
A flexible government-mandated system would likely be
more efficient and less burdensome than one that required
that all firms revamp their traceability systems to conform
to a standard template. In the United States, both AMS
and FSA rely on industry-developed traceability and
bookkeeping systems to monitor the domestic origin of
food purchased for Federal procurement programs.
Programs such as the U.S. national organic food standard
depend on private certifiers to provide flexibility to the
system. Organic food certifiers, approved by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, work with growers and han-
dlers to develop individualized recordkeeping systems to
assure traceability of food products grown, marketed, and
distributed in accordance with national organic standards.
Market Failure and Traceability 
for Food Safety 
Though failure by private markets to supply adequate
traceability for product differentiation is a concern to
regulators, an even bigger concern is failure by private
markets to supply adequate traceability systems for basic
food safety control and monitoring. In some cases, the
amount of traceability supplied by firms may be less than
the social optimum because the public health benefits of
traceability for food safety are larger than the firm’s ben-
efits. A firm’s food safety traceability benefits include the
reduction in the potential for lost markets, liability costs,
and recalls, while the potential social benefits include a
long list of avoided costs, including medical expenditures
and productivity losses due to foodborne illness, costs of
pain and suffering, and the costs of premature death. 
Social benefits may also include the avoided costs to
firms that produce safe products but lose sales because of
safety problems in the industry. A firm’s traceability sys-
tem not only helps minimize potential damages for the
individual firm, it also helps minimize damages to the
whole industry and to upstream and downstream indus-
tries as well. For example, a series of widespread ground
meat recalls has the potential to hurt the reputation and
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industries such as fast food restaurants and upstream sup-
pliers such as ranchers. The benefits to the industry of a
traceability system pinpointing the source of the bad meat
and minimizing recall (and bad publicity) could therefore
be much larger than the benefits to the individual firm. 
As mentioned in the section on differentiation, the
amount of traceability supplied by firms may also be
lower than the social optimum because firms may find
value in some level of anonymity. If traceability systems
increase the probability that a firm will be identified in
the case of food safety problems and exposed to liability,
then the firm may have an incentive to underinvest in
traceability: the value of anonymity may reduce the
firm’s incentives to invest in traceability systems.
Private cost-benefit calculations may also differ from
social calculations if the costs of erecting traceability
systems are lower when industry groups or governments
undertake these projects than when individual firms
build them on their own. Or, once built, the marginal
cost of including other firms or foods in the traceability
system may be small or nothing. In these cases, the pri-
vate benefits of such systems may not outweigh the pri-
vate costs while the social benefits do outweigh the
social costs. Public defense and libraries are classic
examples of such a situation; traceability systems for
detecting and tracing foodborne illness outbreaks to
their source may be another. 
Firms have an incentive to identify and isolate unsafe
foods and to remove them from the supply chain as
quickly as possible. Few firms, however, have an incen-
tive to monitor the health of the Nation’s consumers in
order to speed the detection of unsafe product. Such a
traceability system would be extremely expensive and
would be poorly targeted to any individual firm’s needs.
The benefits to an individual firm of building a system to
monitor all foodborne illness outbreaks just in case one
is linked to the firm’s product would certainly not out-
weigh the costs. However, the collective benefits to
industry and to consumers may well outweigh the costs.
Early detection and removal of contaminated foods can
reduce the incidence of foodborne illness and save lives. 
Industry Efforts To Increase Traceability 
for Food Safety
A host of new food safety concerns have pushed food
industries to reevaluate their safety protocols, including
their traceability systems. For the most part, industry has
worked to strengthen safety systems in response to new
threats, though the speed and success of industry response
has varied. The fresh fruit and vegetable sector has proba-
bly been the most successful in adjusting traceability sys-
tems in response to new safety problems. This reflects the
fact that firms in the sector have already established
robust traceability systems and that the industry has expe-
rienced a series of foodborne illness outbreaks. 
In the mid-1990s a series of well-publicized outbreaks,
traced back to microbial contamination of produce,
raised public awareness of potential problems. Recent
outbreaks like the one traced to scallions served at a
restaurant chain, continue to focus public attention on
safety of fresh fruit and vegetables. Good-agricultural-
practice audits, including traceability audits, are becom-
ing a necessary part of doing business, as more and more
buyers demand safety assurances. In addition, several
grower organizations have developed systems to
strengthen traceability. In the case of an outbreak, a
grower organization that encourages traceback can prove
to the public that their product is not responsible for the
problem. Or, in the unfortunate case where the industry
is responsible for the outbreak, the problem grower or
growers can be identified and damage can be limited to
that group.
The grain industry has yet to experience a well-publi-
cized, pivotal safety problem. There have not been any
major safety scares that would warrant the reevaluation
of the industry’s safety system, including its traceability
systems. The highly processed nature of the product, and
the large number of critical safety points along the pro-
duction chain, largely eliminate safety problems that may
arise early in the production process, thereby reducing
the need for detailed traceability systems. 
The beef sector may be experiencing the most difficulty
of the three sectors in responding to new safety threats.
These difficulties can be traced to uncertainties in the
science of food safety and pathogen control in meat and
institutional and philosophical barriers to traceability in
the sector. Despite these difficulties, the industry has
developed a number of approaches for strengthening
food safety accountability and traceability. For example,
the Beef Industry Food Safety Council (BIFSCo) has
taken on the task of organizing representatives from all
segments of the beef industry to develop industry-wide,
science-based strategies to solve the problem of E. coli
O157:H7 and other foodborne pathogens in beef.
Industry groups are also cooperating to develop the
national animal identification plan (see box, “Animal
Identification,” p. 32).
Buyers in the beef industry are also increasingly relying
on contracting or associations to improve product trace-
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have begun adopting the role of channel captains, moni-
toring the safety of products up and down the supply
chain. By demanding safer products from their suppliers,
these restaurants have successfully created markets for
food safety. The success of these markets rests on the
ability of these large buyers to enforce standards through
testing and process audits—and to identify and reward
suppliers who meet safety standards and punish those
who do not. These large buyers have spurred the develop-
ment of traceability systems throughout the industry. 
Government Efforts To Increase Traceability 
for Food Safety 
Mandatory traceability is one possible policy tool for
increasing the food system’s traceback capability.
However, since the government’s primary objective for
food safety traceback is the swift identification and
removal of unsafe foods, other policy tools may be more
efficient than mandatory traceability. Policy aimed at
ensuring that foods are quickly removed from the sys-
tem, while allowing firms the flexibility to determine the
manner, will likely be more efficient than mandatory
traceability systems. For some firms, plant closure and
total product recall may be the most efficient method for
isolating production problems and removing contaminat-
ed food from the market. For other firms, detailed trace-
back, allowing the firm to pinpoint the production prob-
lem and minimize the extent of recall may be the most
efficient solution. In either case, contaminated food is
quickly removed from distribution channels and the
social objective is achieved.
A performance standard, such as a standard for mock
recall speed, is one possible policy tool for providing
firms with incentives to establish efficient traceability
systems. Mock recalls are a good tool for checking the
ability of a system to quickly and accurately identify and
remove contaminated product. In the United States, the
two Federal agencies responsible for food safety, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), encourage firms
to perform mock or simulated recalls to ensure that
potentially contaminated foods can be tracked and
removed from the system in an expedient manner. In
addition, most, if not all, third-party safety/quality con-
trol certifiers require traceability documentation and
mock recalls as part of their safety audits. Depending on
the needs of the client, many also monitor and time mock
recalls to evaluate the speed and precision with which
facilities can identify potentially contaminated product.
Société Générale de Surveillance monitors a 2-hour
mock recall for many of its clients. 
One area where industry has not had any incentive to
create traceability systems is in tracking food once it has
been sold and consumed. Firms have an incentive to
identify and isolate unsafe foods and to remove them
from the supply chain as quickly as possible. But, few
firms have an incentive to monitor the health of the
Nation’s consumers in order to speed the detection of
unsafe product. Such a traceability system would be
extremely expensive and would be poorly targeted to any
individual firm’s needs. The benefits of building a system
to monitor all foodborne illness outbreaks just in case
one is linked to the firm’s product would certainly not
outweigh the costs. However, the collective benefits to
industry and to consumers may outweigh the costs.
Government-supplied foodborne illness sentinel systems
could, therefore, play an important role in closing gaps in
the food systems traceability system. By providing this
public good, the government could increase the capabili-
ty of the whole food supply chain to efficiently and
quickly respond to food safety problems.
In the United States, the Federal Government and other
public health entities have taken strides in building the
infrastructure for tracking the incidence and sources of
foodborne illness. The Foodborne Diseases Active
Surveillance Network (FoodNet) combines active surveil-
lance for foodborne diseases with related epidemiologic
studies to help public health officials better respond to
new and emerging foodborne diseases. FoodNet is a col-
laborative project of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), nine States, USDA, and the FDA.
Another network, PulseNet, based at CDC, connects pub-
lic health laboratories in 26 States, Los Angeles County,
New York City, the FDA, and USDA to a system of stan-
dardized testing and information sharing. 
With better surveillance of foodborne illness outbreaks,
regulators can increase the likelihood that unsafe foods
and unsafe producers will be more quickly identified.
Better surveillance therefore reduces the risk of food-
borne illness in two ways: by more quickly removing
unsafe food from the food supply and by putting addi-
tional pressure on suppliers to produce safe foods. By
increasing the likelihood that unsafe producers are identi-
fied, surveillance systems increase the likelihood that
these producers will bear some of the costs of unsafe
production, including recall, liability, and bad publicity.
Increased surveillance therefore increases the potential
costs of selling unsafe food, providing producers with
increased incentive to invest in safety systems, including
traceability systems. 
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tor supply of traceability, we found that the private sector
has a number of reasons to establish and maintain trace-
ability systems and, as a result, the private sector has a
substantial capacity to trace. This does not mean that the
wheat in every slice of bread is traceable to the field or
that the apples in every glass of apple juice are traceable
to the tree. Firms evaluate their costs and benefits with
respect to supply management, safety, and credence-
attribute marketing to determine the efficient breadth,
depth, and precision for their traceability systems. The
net benefits of establishing and maintaining traceability
systems are not necessarily positive for every attribute,
for every step of the supply chain, or for the highest
degree of precision. 
Traceability systems are a tool to help firms manage the
flow of inputs and product to improve efficiency, food
safety and product quality, and product differentiation.
However, traceability systems do not accomplish any of
these objectives by themselves. Simply knowing where a
product is in the supply chain does not improve supply
management unless the traceability system is paired with
a real-time delivery system or some other inventory-con-
trol system. Tracking food by lot in the production
process does not improve safety unless the tracking sys-
tem is linked to an effective safety control system. And
of course, traceability systems do not create credence
attributes, they simply verify their existence. Traceability
systems are one element of a firm’s supply side manage-
ment system, safety system, and production strategy.
Traceability systems are built to complement the other
elements in each system. 
The development of traceability systems throughout the
food supply system reflects a dynamic balancing of ben-
efits and costs. Though many firms operate traceability
systems for supply management, quality control, and
product differentiation, these objectives have played
varying roles in driving the development of traceability
systems in different sectors of the food supply system. In
the fresh produce sector, quality control and food scare
problems have been the primary motivation pushing
firms to establish traceability systems. In the grain sector,
supply management and growing demand for high-value
attributes is pushing firms to differentiate and track pro-
duction. In the beef sector, food scares and demand for
high-value traceability systems have only recently begun
to motivate firms to adopt traceability systems tracking
production from animal to final meat product. 
The varying costs of traceability systems, reflecting dif-
ferent product characteristics, industry organization, pro-
duction processes, and distribution and accounting sys-
tems, have also influenced the development of traceabili-
ty systems across the food supply. The development of
traceability systems in the fresh produce industry has
been greatly influenced by the characteristics of the
product. Perishability of and quality variation in fresh
fruits and vegetables necessitate that the product be
boxed and its quality attributes identified early in the
supply chain, either in the field or in the packinghouse.
This practice has facilitated the establishment of trace-
ability for a number of objectives including marketing,
food safety, supply management, and differentiation of
new quality attributes. In grains, safety and quality are
largely controlled at the elevator level, greatly reducing
the need for traceability throughout the sector. For beef,
institutional and philosophical barriers have slowed the
adoption of traceability systems for tracking animals
from farm to table. In every sector, technological innova-
tions are helping to reduce traceability costs and to spur
the adoption of sophisticated systems.
Our investigation of the private supply of traceability in
the United States has led us to conclude that for the
most part, the food industry is successfully developing
and maintaining traceability systems to meet changing
objectives. In the three food sectors we investigated,
producers seem to be responding to consumer demand
for product differentiation. When final or input demand
is strong enough to cover the cost of product differentia-
tion, producers have responded with new products and
new traceability systems to substantiate credence attrib-
ute claims, including food safety claims. To control for
potential fraud or unfair competition, industry groups
and individual firms are increasingly relying on the serv-
ices of third-party auditors to verify the existence of cre-
dence attributes. 
For the most part, industry has also worked to strengthen
food safety systems in response to new threats, though
the speed and success of the response has varied. The
fresh fruit and vegetable sector has probably been the
most successful in adjusting traceability systems in
response to new safety problems, while the beef industry,
with its history of limited liability, seems to have had the
most difficulties. In all three food sectors, alliances, ver-
tical integration, and contracts are facilitating traceability
for safety and other quality attributes. 
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V. ConclusionsOur analysis suggests that government mandated and
managed traceability is usually not the best-targeted
policy response to potential market failures involving
traceability. Even in those cases where traceability is
necessary for the development of differentiated markets,
mandatory traceability systems often miss the mark.
Systems that include attributes that are not of value to
consumers generate costs without any corresponding
benefits. Only systems that focus on attributes of value
to consumers actually facilitate market development. In
addition, the widespread voluntary adoption of trace-
ability may complicate the application of mandatory
systems. Mandatory systems that prescribe one trace-
ability template and fail to allow for variation across
systems are likely to impose costs that are not justified
by efficiency gains.
One area where the government may be able to increase
the supply of a valuable public good is by augmenting
tracking systems for contaminated food once it has been
bought and consumed. By strengthening foodborne ill-
ness surveillance systems to speed the detection of food-
borne illness outbreaks and the identification of the
source of illness, the government could increase the
capability of the whole food supply chain to efficiently
and quickly respond to food safety problems. In addition,
because they increase the likelihood that unsafe produc-
ers are identified, surveillance systems may provide pro-
ducers with increased incentive to invest in safety sys-
tems, including traceability systems. In fact, any policy
that increases the cost and probability of getting caught
selling unsafe food provides producers with incentives to
increase their traceback capabilities. These types of poli-
cies will encourage the development of more efficient
systems for the swift removal of unsafe foods and for
investment in safer food systems—which is the ultimate
objective of food safety policy. 
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history of mandating programs that contain traceability
requirements. Government regulations have a diverse set
of objectives. Often, they take into consideration ensur-
ing a level of food safety, preventing and limiting animal
diseases, or facilitating market transactions. Some of
these regulations entail establishing traceability systems
for select attributes in particular food subsectors, while
other regulations have broader objectives but, in effect,
require firms to develop tracing capacity. Whether the
intent of the regulation is to address food safety or ani-
mal disease concerns or other issues, Government-
imposed demands for traceability usually require infor-
mation about the sellers and buyers (name, address,
phone, etc.) and product-related information. The
demands on recordkeeping are usually one-up, one-back
traceability. Less frequently required are traceability sys-
tems for quality credence attributes that have become
more prevalent in the private sector, although there are
exceptions, such as the national organic food standard.
Below we briefly highlight some important regulations
that require traceability systems. We indicate the relevant
legislation, the objectives of the regulations, the product
coverage and the recordkeeping that is required. The list
is not intended to be encyclopedic but, instead, illustrative
of important and recent legislation that affects tracing by
food suppliers.
Meat, Poultry, and Egg Inspection Acts
Key Legislation and Dates: Legislation was passed in
1906 for meats, 1957 for poultry, and 1970 for eggs. The
Wholesome Meat and Poultry Acts of 1967 and 1968
substantially amended the initial legislation.
Objective: The Meat, Poultry, and Egg Inspection Acts
have the primary goals of preventing adulterated or mis-
branded livestock and products from being sold as food
and to ensure that meat and meat products are slaugh-
tered and processed under sanitary conditions. The Food
Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), USDA, is respon-
sible for ensuring that these products are safe and accu-
rately labeled.
Coverage: Livestock, meat, poultry, and shell eggs and
egg products.
Recordkeeping Required: The Acts call for complete
and accurate recordkeeping and disclosure of all transac-
tions in conducting commerce in livestock, meat, poultry,
and eggs.
For example, packers, renderers, animal food manufac-
turers, or other businesses slaughtering, preparing, freez-
ing, packaging, or labeling any carcasses must keep
records of their transactions. Businesses only need to
maintain one-up, one-back records.
For imported meat, poultry, and egg products, importers
must satisfy requirements of two USDA agencies—FSIS
and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS)—and the U.S. Customs Service (USDA, FSIS,
October 2003). Imported meat and poultry must be certi-
fied, not only by country but by individual establishment
within a country. Certificates are issued by the govern-
ment of the exporting country and are required to accom-
pany imported meat, poultry, and egg products to identify
products by country and plants of origin, destination,
shipping marks, and amount. FSIS demands that the
country of origin provide a health certificate indicating
the product was inspected and passed by the country’s
inspection service and is eligible for export to the United
States. To meet APHIS requirements, the product must
not come from countries where certain animal diseases
are present. USDA requirements are binding as the U.S.
Customs Service demands that the importer post a bond,
including the value of the product plus duties and fees,
until FSIS notifies the Service of the results of its rein-
spection. Failure to meet U.S. requirements may lead to
forfeiture plus penalties.
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
Key Legislation and Dates: Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act (PACA) was enacted in 1930.
Objective: PACA was enacted to promote fair trading
practices in the fruit and vegetable industry. The objec-
tive of the recordkeeping is to help facilitate the market-
ing of fruit and vegetables, to verify claims, and to mini-
mize any misrepresentation of the condition of the item,
particularly when long distances separate the traders.
Coverage: Fruit and vegetables.
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Appendix
Select Milestones in U.S Traceability Requirements for FoodsRecordkeeping Required: PACA calls for complete and
accurate recordkeeping and disclosure for shippers, bro-
kers, and other first handlers of produce selling on behalf
of growers. PACA has extensive recordkeeping require-
ments on who buyers and sellers are, what quantities and
kinds of produce is transacted, and when and how the
transaction takes place. PACA regulations recognize that
the varied fruit and vegetable industries will have differ-
ent types of recordkeeping needs, and the regulations
allow for this variance. Records need to be kept for 2
years from the closing date of the transaction.
National Shellfish Sanitation Program
Key Legislation and Dates: Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, portions revised or new as amended by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization Act
and various State health regulations.
Shellfish must comply with the general requirements of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and also with
requirements of State health agencies cooperating in the
National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP) adminis-
tered by the FDA in cooperation with the Interstate
Shellfish Sanitation Conference (ISSC) (FDA, CFSAN,
January 2003). 
Objective: A key objective is to mitigate the adverse
effects of a disease outbreak. Regional FDA specialists
with expert knowledge about shellfish assist State offi-
cials with traceback. When notified rapidly about cases,
they are able to sample harvest waters to discover possi-
ble sources of infection and to close waters when prob-
lems are identified.
Coverage: Shellfish.
Recordkeeping Required: Shellfish plants certified by
the State Shellfish Sanitation Control Authority are
required to place their certification number on each con-
tainer or package of shellfish shipped. The number indi-
cates that the shipper is under State inspection, and that it
meets the applicable State requirements. It is central to
tracing and identifying contaminated shipments. Shippers
are also required to keep records showing the origin and
disposition of all shellfish handled and to make these
records available to the control authorities.
Organic Foods Production Act
Key Legislation and Dates: Organic Foods Production
Act was enacted in 1990. Act was subsequently amended
and rules went into effect October 2002.
Objective: The objective is to establish national stan-
dards governing the marketing of certain agricultural
products as organically produced products, to assure con-
sumers that organically produced products meet national
production, handling, and labeling standards, and to
facilitate commerce in fresh and processed food that are
organically produced.
Coverage: Organic foods.
Recordkeeping Required: Organic food certifiers work
with growers and handlers to develop an individualized
recordkeeping system to assure traceability of food
products grown, marketed, and distributed in accordance
with national organic standards (USDA, AMS, October
2002). Records can be adapted to the particular business
as long as they fully disclose all activities and transac-
tions in sufficient detail to be readily understood, have
an audit trail sufficient to prove that they are in compli-
ance with the Act, and are maintained for at least 5
years. Many different types of records are acceptable.
For example, documents supporting an organic system
may include field, storage, breeding, animal purchase,
and health records, sales invoices, general ledgers, and
financial statements.
In order for the attribute “organic” to be preserved, grow-
ers and handlers must maintain traceability from receiv-
ing point to point of sale and ensure that only organic or
approved materials are used throughout the supply chain.
Thus, for a traceability system for organic products to be
viable it must confer depth. 
Food Assistance Programs
Key Legislation and Dates: The National School Lunch
Act was enacted in 1946 after World War II.
Objective: To reduce malnutrition and improve poor eat-
ing habits, the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides
food assistance to schools, Native American reservations,
and needy families, the elderly, and the homeless through
Federal Food Assistance Programs. In addition to finan-
cial subsidies for food purchases, the institutions receive
entitlement and bonus commodities. The bonus com-
modities are procured to support the farm community in
specific commodity markets that are experiencing weak
market conditions.
Coverage: Flour, grains, oils and shortenings, dairy, red
meat, fish, poultry, egg, fruit, vegetable, and peanut
products.
Recordkeeping Required: To guarantee that foods are
strictly American, producers who win U.S. Department
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establishing the origin of each ingredient in a food prod-
uct (USDA, AMS, 2003). The producer pays USDA
inspectors to review the traceability documents and certi-
fy the origin of each food. Starting with the “code” or lot
number on a processed product, inspectors use producer-
supplied documentation to trace product origins all the
way back to a grower’s name and address. 
Country of Origin Labeling
Key Legislation and Dates: The legislation amends the
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 by incorporating
country of origin labeling (COOL) in the Farm Security
and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-171).
Specific guidelines for voluntary labeling were issued in
2002 and are currently in effect (USDA, AMS, October
11, 2002). Mandatory labeling rules were proposed in
October 2003. The Farm Act states that mandatory
COOL is to be promulgated no later than September 30,
2004. However, the 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act
delays until September 20, 2006, implementation for all
covered commodities, except wild and farm raised fish,
which must be labeled beginning September 30, 2004.
Objective: The objective is to provide consumers with
more information regarding the country where covered
commodities originate.
Coverage: The legislation affects the labeling of beef,
pork, lamb, fish, shellfish, fresh fruit, vegetables, and
peanuts. COOL is not required if these foods are ingredi-
ents in processed food items or are a combination of sub-
stantive food components. Examples include bacon,
orange juice, peanut butter, bagged salad, seafood med-
ley, and mixed nuts.
Food service establishments such as restaurants, food
stands, and similar facilities including those within retail
stores (delicatessens and salad bars, for example) are
exempt from the requirements. Moreover, grocery stores
that have an annual invoice value of less than $230,000
of fruits and vegetables are exempt from COOL require-
ments. Consequently, retail food outlets, like butcher
shops and fish markets that do not sell fruit and vegeta-
bles, are not included under COOL requirements.
Recordkeeping Required: Retailers may use a label,
stamp, mark, placard, or other clear and visible sign on
the covered commodity, or on the package, display, hold-
ing unit, or bin containing the commodity at the final
point of sale.
The Act and the proposed rules have stringent require-
ments on the depth of recordkeeping. First, the supplier
responsible for initiating the country-of-origin declara-
tion must establish and maintain records that substantiate
the claim. If a firm already possesses records, then it is
not necessary to create and maintain additional informa-
tion. As a vertical supply chain, there must be a verifi-
able audit trail to ensure the integrity of the traceability
system, that is, firms must assure the transfer of informa-
tion of the country-of-origin claim. As a consequence,
firms along the supply chain must maintain records to
establish and identify the immediate previous source and
the immediate subsequent recipient of the transaction.
For an imported product, the traceability system must
extend back to at least the port of entry into the United
States. Firms have flexibility in the types of records that
need to be maintained and systems that transfer informa-
tion. Records need to be kept for 2 years.
The proposed rules provide flexibility in the type of
recordkeeping. The Act states that the Secretary shall not
use a mandatory identification system to verify country
of origin. The U.S. Department of Agriculture provides
examples of documents and records that may be useful to
verify compliance with the Country of Origin Labeling
provisions of the 2002 Farm Bill. (See http://www.ams.
usda.gov/cool/records.htm.) These records vary depend-
ing on the business activities. As an example, a ship
catching wild fish may keep records of site maps, and
vessel, harvesting, and U.S. flagged vessel identification
records. A distributor of wild fish may keep records of
invoices, receiving and purchase records, sales receipts,
inventories, labeling requirements, a segregation plan,
and UPC codes.
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act 
Key Legislation and Dates: The Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 provides new authority to the Federal Drug
Administration.
Objective: The objective is to protect the Nation’s food
supply against the threat of serious adverse health conse-
quences to human and animal health from intentional
contamination.
Coverage: All foods are subject to the legislation except
meat, poultry, and eggs (which are under U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s jurisdiction).
The Act requires both domestic and foreign facilities to
register with the FDA no later than December 12, 2003
(FDA, CFSAN, 2002). Facilities subject to these provi-
sions are those that manufacture, process, pack, trans-
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exempts farms, restaurants, other retail food establish-
ments, nonprofit food establishments in which food is
prepared for or served directly to the consumer; and fish-
ing vessels from the requirement to register. Also, foreign
facilities subject to the registration requirement are limit-
ed to those that manufacture, process, pack, or hold food,
only if food from such facility is exported to the United
States without further processing or packaging outside
the United States.
Recordkeeping Required: The Act requires the creation
and maintenance of records needed to determine the
immediate previous sources and the immediate subse-
quent recipients of food (i.e., one-up, one-down). For
imported food the rules also require prior notice of ship-
ment and a description of the article including code iden-
tifiers, the name, address, telephone, fax, and email of
the manufacturer, shipper, and the grower (if known), the
country of origin, the country from which the article is
shipped, and anticipated arrival information. Records are
required to be retained for 2 years except for perishable
products and animal foods (for example, pet foods)
where 1 year of recordkeeping is allowed. Records may
be stored offsite.
Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA, has jurisdic-
tion of meats, poultry, and eggs. FSIS has been issuing
guidance to businesses engaged in production and distri-
bution of these USDA-regulated foods. Among the guid-
ance principles for slaughter and processing facilities,
FSIS recommends validated procedures to ensure the
traceback and traceforward of all raw materials and fin-
ished products.
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